This article represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of this site. This document is property of Dr. Jaewoo Choo and is not to be reproduced in whole or part without permission of the author: Jaewoo Choo, Ph.D.Professor of Chinese Politics and Foreign PolicyDepartment of Chinese StudiesKyung Hee University1 Seocheon-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do 449-701, Republic of Korea(O)+82-31-201-2210, (F)+82-31-204-8113
EAST ASIA, Winter 2005, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 39-58.During 2003 and 2004, after having successfully hosted two six-party talks and a round of working-group level meetings on the North Korean nuclear crisis, China pushed to institutionalize the talks. Such an initiative coming from China was a shock to the world, since it has long maintained a passive, negative and defensive posture against multilateral cooperative security arrangements. This article declares that China’s idea to utilize the six-party talks as a steppingstone toward a multilateral cooperative security arrangement is premature. It argues that the first priority is to address the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea—what was, then, believed to be the solution for the North Korean nuclear crisis. This article dissects the failure and identifies one critical factor for the viability of any future peaceful resolution—the economic sanctions that the US has placed against North Korea for the past half-century. The author argues that if the issue of sanctions is not addressed, the current six-party talks will not be successful.
Keywords: Six-party talks, institutionalization, economic sanctions, confidence and trust, Geneva Agreed Framework, economic aid and assistance
I. IntroductionContrary to the way in which the first North Korean nuclear crisis (1993/ 94) was approached and “resolved” with bilateral contacts between the US and the North, when the second one erupted in 2002, a multilateral approach was called for by concerned states—the US, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. China did not immediately view a multilateral approach as viable or appropriate under its policy that “the crisis must be handled by the immediately concerned parties (dangshizhe yuanzi).”1 For some time, despite the international community’s ardent demand on China to exert influence on the North to join multilateral discussions, China unyieldingly remained indifferent to the idea of a multilateral approach until it hosted the so-called “three-way talks” in March 2003 and the six-party talks in August 2003.2 China’s reservation about the idea of a multilateral approach drew much speculative doubt as to whether Beijing had influence on Pyongyang—despite being the North’s sole remaining ally.3 Once it succeeded in hosting the three-way talks and subsequent rounds of the six-party talks, such doubts miraculously disappeared.4
While there is much debate on the purposes behind Beijing’s decision to assume an intermediary role between the world and Pyongyang,5 the question of China’s obsession with the continuity of the talks remains unanswered.6 Ever since successfully hosting the first round of the six-party talks in August 2003, Chinese endeavors have become very explicit. Furthermore, Beijing now envisages the successful inaugural meeting as a gateway to realize the long-sought goal of building a multilateral cooperative security institution in Northeast Asia. It has turned itself into an ardent advocate for institutionalization of the talks. As early as November 2003, long before the second round of the talks (February 2004), the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs, Dai Bingguo, disclosed his nation’s idea of institutionalizing the talks to his Japanese counterparts during his visit to Tokyo.7
The idea of institutionalization may indeed be very enticing, considering the fact that there is no precedent in which all six regional states would congregate to discuss regional security issues, namely the North Korean nuclear crisis. It cannot, however, be brought about by a mere meeting of states with a simple intention to search for a solution to the crisis. This is probably the reason why the six-party talks have yet to produce any substantial results. In other words, the talks have not been anything but a mere dialogue, in which the participating states only get to check out the positions of others on a sporadic basis.8 Believed to be a self-driven engine due to the shared perception of (negative) externalities that endanger the national security of the parties concerned, the talks are stalemated. As claimed by many pundits, the stalemate may be overcome if and when an operational mechanism is found because it can be instrumental in prioritizing the agenda, facilitating the bargaining process under the rules and norms agreed upon, and allow for the implementation and enforcement of a resulting agreement. This said, institutionalization has so become an alternative. States create international institutions to solve problems that they cannot solve alone.9
In a narrow sense, international institutions can be defined as explicit arrangements, such as treaties and conventions, that regulate behavior.10 Institutional building, however, requires some critical substances, such as norms, rules, regulations, and so on. These substances can be materialized through the so called “bargaining process” among the concerned states. Once this process is completed, norms and rules have to be observed and implemented by a mechanism that is established as a consequence of the process. The format of the institution, however, is not too important as “states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly.”11 Whether it will take the form of an anarchic institution or a hierarchic institution, 12 the final design of the six-party institution will be largely subject to how the concerned parties define the answer to the following questions. Who the perpetrator(s) and victim(s)? Is the US’ unwillingness to talk with and make concession to North Korea as responsible for the impasse of the talks as claimed by other members? What are the externalities? Are they symmetric or asymmetric? 13 What is the scope of the problem? Is its orientation going to be issue-specific reciprocity or broad-based linkage? In what sequence will the packaged solution be carried out; and under what conditionality will these benefits and incentives for cooperation materialize?
The aforementioned questions are yet to be answered in critical ways. For example, as the member states of the six-party talks began to witness ever rising divergence in their respective positions with respect to managing the talks and the North Korea issue, the problem of defining perpetrator(s) and victim(s) returned to square one. This made it much more difficult for the member states to coordinate for a consistent policy. The externalities of the six parties may also be perceived in intriguing ways. While all member states may simultaneously perceive themselves as victims of their negative externalities in one way or the other (symmetric externality-North Korea vs. the rest), the states dissatisfied with the process of the talks would have a strong propensity to blame others for the cost that they would have to bear due to the lack of their power to steer the outcome to their favor (asymmetric externality). 14 In the latter case especially, the victims would realize the perpetrators would have no incentives to cooperate unless compensated, whereas in symmetric situations, states that generate externality are dissatisfied with the status quo, and therefore, tend to seek compensation for their actions as victims as well as perpetrators.15
The six-party talks are challenged by both externality situations, and thus, need to blend in features and characteristics of both anarchic and hierarchic institutions if they are to be institutionalized. The latter can be accounted for two reasons: There is neither a hegemonic power that possesses a total and absolute control to influence the outcome of the institutional operation, nor a concrete agreement among the participating states against the perpetrator (in this case, North Korea). For the due process to realize, trust and confidence must be established between the US and North Korea, and as claimed by many in recent years, it is the former who ought to adopt a different strategy in approaching the latter to achieve this end.16 One meaningful step is lifting the economic sanctions that the US has placed on the North since its birth in1948. While it is not easy for the US to adopt benign measures in the political realm, it would be less difficult to do so in the economic arena. This article will address the need and reasons for institutionalization of the six-party talks from the Chinese perspective and historical lessons that we may receive from the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework and four-party talks. As one of the means to build trust and confidence between the US and North Korea, this article suggests that lifting the economic sanctions that the former has placed on the latter would be effective. Though it would be a daunting task for any US president to confront the US Congress to do so, it would lead the talks toward more positive direction, by which it would allow institutionalization to become a possible and feasible transformation. As long as the US intractably and persistently abides by the principle of hardcore political reciprocity in dealing with North Korea, easing its economic measures against the North could have a related effect of gaining confidence and trust from Pyongyang. Under the assumption that institutionalization is an alternative that could overcome the current stalemate and could be self-driven for solution, this article explores its feasibility by making a theoretical assessment.
II. Why Institutionalize?: China’s Reasons and Lessons from Past
ExperiencesAs early as November, 2003, according to a Chinese televised report during his visit to Japan, China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, Dai Bingguo, reportedly explained his nation’s vision of institutionalizing the six-party talks.17 China justified its necessity with a few potential advantages that it foresaw in institutionalization. It would be the only way, for instance, to have a gravitating affect on the sustainability of the talks by the actors that have almost zero confidence and trust in one another. A mere dialogue format of negotiation by such actors is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain without disruption or discontinuity, and is susceptible to a subtle breakdown. In addition, an institutionalized mechanism underpinned by the standing multilateral framework will allow for better implementation of whatever solutions the talks produces because all actors would be legally bounded by the norms and rules set by themselves. Furthermore, institutionalization of the talks could possibly lead to the eventual establishment of a security regime based on multilateralism and regionalism in Northeast Asia, where skepticism about such a regime still prevails to date for political, economic and cultural reasons.18
The rising need for nations to cooperate against so-called “transnational concerns” and “nontraditional security threats” also makes this prospect very enticing.19 According to reports, Mr. Dai envisaged institutionalization as a necessary condition to “sustain the momentum of the talks.” With respect to the meaning of institutionalization, China’s interpretation of it is to transform the six-party talks into a regional security dialogue, such as security guarantee dialogue for Northeast Asia (dongheiya anquan baozhang duihua). Given the vision and framework for institutionalization, Mr. Dai went further to explain the mechanism and responsibility of the institutionalized form of the talks. Since the current six-party talks are held on a sporadic basis, Mr. Dai emphasized, it is absolutely necessary to establish the “special small group” to persistently continue talks on practical matters on regular basis. On the organization of the institution, he proposed of setting up a “special small group (tebie xiaozu),” that would comprise of representatives from all six nations and act as a representing office. The group should consist of representatives from all six nations, whose official status should not be lower than vice minister (fubuzhang) or director level (sizhang).20 Under such a scheme, the Chinese vice minister noted, working level personnel within the institution should be all comprised of those at managerial level, at least. Furthermore, to achieve this end, the chairmanship that China has thus far assumed as the host of the talks shall be transferred to, and assumed by, other parties: each nation taking turns for a certain period of time. It would allow the actors to be more respectful to and more responsible with the fate of the talks.
Nonetheless what China envisions in institutionalization does not fully explain the reason as to why the talks need to institutionalize at this particular stage. In other words, it does not sound persuasive to the parties, all of whom lack mutual trust and confidence in one another. Without prior fulfillment of such preconditions, institutionalization of the talks will remain a very unrealistic and unfeasible scheme. 21 Unlike the conventional wisdom, however, it is perhaps for this reason that China is persistently advocating institutionalization. Given the fact that the six parties are all lacking in mutual trust and confidence, institutionalization may be a viable source that would bind them together as a coherent unit and push the talks to continue without interruption or breakdown. Under the circumstances, institutionalization must have some alternatives as to how it is going to overcome the obvious and failed premise.
For this, it requires sound goals and objectives. The goal and purpose of institutionalization of the talks can easily be drafted based on what the international actors around the Korean peninsula have learned from their experience with a similar crisis that first developed almost a decade ago. Institutionalization is absolutely necessary because no one trusts anyone. 22 There is absolutely almost zero confidence in one another among the participating nations of the six-party talks. Apart from the legacy of the Cold War, as claimed by many,23 growing nationalism in the individual state is severely hindering the nations as well as the region to have any opportunity to plant the seed of confidence and trust. Against this background, it may be better for states with no mutual confidence and trust to first build a framework for cooperation in which they can way up to building confidence and trust in one another. The second lesson of their experience is that the framework needs to have a strong commitment from the participating states, regardless of how deep their suspicions of one another’s intentions and actions. This commitment has to be also enforced by some kind of legal action.
In other words, their commitment has to be legally binding, with checks and balances, agreed norms, and regulations at work. Furthermore, states should not, at least in principle, allow their old distrustful perception of other’s intentions and purposes to come into play,24 especially at the inaugural stage of the institutionalization process. Once preoccupation with old images and perceptions has any say in the process or in the outcomes of the process, it could only generate a negative effect on the actors’ commitment. It could also easily led to a meltdown, as previously witnessed in the four-party talks in the late 1990sthat perished with no substantial achievements to match the original goals and purposes.25 The third lesson leads us to the need to establish a supervising and/or governing body for effective implementation of whatever agreement and consensus the talks generate. Without a function, even if a framework is created, already distrustful members of the framework will not sacrifice themselves, nor will they make any kind of commitment to carry out whatever they all agreed, and adopted, as a solution. As long as they perceive one another through a prism of distrust, they will exert themselves only if the others will move first, thereby naturally making any agreement impossible. Such a case was clear in the course of implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea in the following years.26
The fact of the matter is that their failure to observe what they have agreed in the Framework was not due to their lack of will or responsibility, but was rather for their lack of trust as to who is going to first abide by the rules they have set forth in the Framework. In other words, while the US was skeptical of North Korea’s commitment to end its nuclear missile development programtesting, the North was skeptical of the US commitment to improve the bilateral relationship. The US commitment, however, was conditioned on the North’s abiding by the Framework.27 In the end; both states procrastinated on observing their respective duties and responsibilities. As there is no third party witness who could confirm how the Framework was supposed to be carried out, only the two parties know what went wrong with the Framework. In other words, the secretive and discreet nature of the negotiation process of the Framework already involved a high risk for a possible breakdown to begin with, considering the mistrust between the two parties. Thus, in order to prevent such a recurrence with whatever outcome is achieved with the six party talks, a governing body installed with authority to supervise the implementation progress of the solution is necessary. The last, but not least, lesson that could be inferred from the previous dealings between the US and North Korea is that the outcome of any kind of agreement reached with the North would be economically costly. Based on what has been estimated as compensation for the cost of the North’s renouncement of its nuclear ambitions, it could be astronomical. The total economic package would depend on how the rest of the participating nations value the worth of the efforts made by the North in abandoning its nuclear ambitions.
Although the estimation of such value may be subjective, the price is certain to be very high. North Korea, for example, is seeking $10 billion from Japan as a compensation for the past wrongdoings during its brutal colonial rule during the first half of the last century, 28 let alone the price for its renunciation of its nuclear ambitions. Additional costs would include economic aid and assistance for the North’s nation building costs, which are too difficult to estimate by any standard. It is particularly so without a similar precedent. Out of such understanding and realization, the US, like China, may have foreseen the necessity for institutionalization of the talks when it mentioned at the World Economic Forum in January 2003, the possible need to expand the number of the talk’s members to ten—although it avoided making a specific reference. On January 25, 2003 the then-US Secretary of the State Colin Powell conveyed such thinking to a representative of then South Korean President elect Roh Moo-hyun’s delegation and currently a Prime Minister of Unification, Jung Dong-young. The message was significant at the time because for the first time it revealed the United States’ potential long-term perspective in its approach to the North Korean problem, namely “5+5.” The US’ thought of expanding the current talks to a group of ten nations that would include additional states such as France, Britain, Australia, and the European Union (EU) bears significant implications for the future course of the talks’ development. First of all, the participation of these states would allow them to gain first hand experience to get a better understanding on the North Korean problem.
Second, they will be a significant part of the peaceful solution of the North’s nuclear problem for their potential to play a substantive role for their highly respected international profile and status in international organizations, which may well be evident when the North Korean bill needs to be cashed.29 Except for China, for instance, all these states of the talks are members of the epistemic community or trust board at international financial institutions.30 They have the authority to decide the North’s accession to international financial and economic institutions, and if a membership is granted, they can also decide whether or not to finance the North’s nation building effort if and when the talks succeed. In addition, the implications of the North’s accession to international financial institutions are twofold. While it would have to be realized with a strict fulfillment of the stipulation that the US will have to eliminate some, if not all, of the economic sanctions and trade embargoes against North Korea, it would lessen the economic and financial burden that the talks’ members would have to endure otherwise.
III. A Viable Way to Build Trust and Confidence: The Lifting of US SanctionsAs suggested in this article, if the six-party talks were to succeed, problems related to North Korea must be dealt with at two levels. Politically related issues, including the current nuclear stand-off and security guarantee of North Korea, shall be left in the hands of the six-party talks members, whereas economic issues with respect to the US’ economic sanctions against the North shall seek a breakthrough at the bilateral level discussions. To date, the US seems to have no intention to deal with these two issues separately. It still unyieldingly insists upon the North to fully comply with its demand for the complete, verifiable, irreversible disarming (CVID) of its nuclear program as a precondition to any further discussion of economic and diplomatic issues and the guarantee of its regime’s survival. The US demand that the North first accept its preconditions only reinforces the standing impasse the talks are currently experiencing, and further reduces any hope for a peaceful solution. In other words, if Washington is to continue to press Pyongyang without any intention to change its stance before the latter’s acceptance of its demands, the consequences of the latter’s failure or rejection would be much more devastating to the regional states’ interests .While there is a growing hope for institutionalization of the six-party talks to become the first formal security regime in the region,31 there is, however, one serious question needs to be dealt with to realize this end—US sanctions against North Korea. The sanctions will otherwise continue to impede the institutionalization process because of their ineffectiveness as a lever in the current predicament of North Korea’s economic survival game. According to an empirical study by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, sanctions in general will work when the following set of preconditions are met: the goal is relatively modest, thus lessening the importance of multilateral cooperation; the target is economically weak and politically unstable; the sanctioner and its target conduct substantial trade together; the sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively to maximize impact; and the sanctioner avoids high costs to itself.32
In the case of the US and North Korea, none these conditions, except for the second one, are met. Under the circumstances, given the US desire for a peaceful solution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, this article tries to address what it takes in practical terms to turn a standing misfortune (wei) into an opportunity (ji), i.e., an opportunity to peacefully solve the nuclear crisis and to build the first multilateral cooperative security regime in Northeast Asia. The very existence of differences of opinion among the six parties in their approach to the problem indicates not consensus33 but a rift that separates the parties from ever-needed cooperation. A division is already drawn between the US and the rest, 34 albeit Japan’s recent policy initiatives show that it is gradually siding with the US on the stick measures.35 Nonetheless, due to its fear of political and economic consequences from a total collapse of the North, Japan would like to see the crisis solved in a peaceful way.
Given the logic that the states geographically adjacent to North Korea want to avoid dealing with the catastrophic consequences of the collapse of Pyongyang regime, economic sanctions evidently will not draw much cooperation from the regional states. In this sense, there is obviously a limit to the economic leverage of the US against the North. Thus, instead of imposing more embargoes, the US may have to shift its strategies toward developing a policy that would hold out the possibility of engagement, normalization, and more aid, 36 if it is sincere with its wish to see positive outcomes from the six party talks. As most proponents of cooperation and engagement would argue the US needs to develop a “road map” similar to its normalization process with Vietnam, China, and to a certain extent, former Soviet Union. In other words, the US must find a way to share the economic costs that will arise in the due process as well as the result of the six-party talks, provided it is willing to cooperate with other concerned parties in advancing its political demands. It is particularly so because it is not realistic at all for the US to persistently insist on the normalization of the relationship with North Korea as a precondition for its clearance of economic sanctions. The fact of the matter is that the current international political and military configuration around the Korean peninsula will simply not allow it to happen. North Korea does not have the strategic value that China possessed in the ’70s, prompting a dramatic shift in US policy and perceptions that led to the lifting of economic sanctions. North Korea does not have economic strategic value as a potential market, as did Vietnam, which drew American businessmen into lobbying against US economic
sanctions.37 Furthermore, the Libyan model cannot be applied to the North Korean case due to its fundamental differences in the way the immediately concerned nations approach their problem with the North. As long as the six-party talks will be perceived as the only viable means to solve the North’s nuclear crisis, participating nations will have to discard any possibility of secret negotiation as a viable way of seeking solution, despite its success with Libya.38
US interests in the region cannot be preserved by unilateral actions, but require strong and close cooperation with regional actors. The US’ current pursuit of its military realignment plan with allies like Japan and South Korea is still in progress. Any interruption due to the consequences of what they perceive as a result of the US’ lack of willingness to peacefully solve the North Korean problem would act against such interests. Already a sufficient number of South Korean people, for instance, perceive the cause of the second nuclear crisis as instigation coordinated by the US.39 In pursuit of its war on terrorism, the US needs China’s cooperation at least on the regional level. Lack of US support to a peaceful solution of the nuclear crisis would only manifest a growing deviation in both parties’ interest to the extent that it would adversely affect China’s cooperative stance. Should China continue to feel unthreatened by the North’s nuclear ambitions, as many Chinese experts expect, the breakdown of the six-party talks would literally have no effect on its interests as long as the North is not subject to foreign military intervention. 40 In short, to many of the six-party members, the talks themselves are not an issue of their policy to North Korea. In other words, their current and future relations with North Korea are not tied to the success of the talks. In the midst of the ‘crisis,’ the relationship of North Korea with the neighboring states in general, and South Korea and China particularly, has witnessed substantial progress, especially in the economic arena since the turn of the 21st century. The progress is well manifested in the steady rise of their total trade volume, investment, and ever-lasting economic aid. First of all, the total trade volume of North Korea with China and South Korea has made a remarkable recovery, thereby helping the state to survive renewed US sanctions and Japan’s recent initiatives to pass similar bills. By utilizing the so called “mirror statistics” provided by the North Korea’s trading partners, as claimed by Nicholas Eberstadt, they can explain how North Korea has managed to finance state survival.41 They have become instrumental in China’s case. Since its accession to World Trade Organization in 2001, China can no longer rely on traditional ways of trade, including barter and credit-based trade with North Korea, that would otherwise be in violation of the WTO’s most favored nation (MFN) clause.42 Thus, China’s trade statistics with North Korea have been made available by the Chinese customs office on a regular basis, as would be the case with other trading partners. As of the first half of 2004, North Korea’s exports totaled $172 million, an increase of 59.7% compared to the previous year, while its imports stood at $346 million, a rise of 28%.43 Meanwhile, Korea overtook Japan ($270 million) as the North’s second largest trading partner in 2003 when it recorded $434 million in exports. Overall, North Korea’s trade has shown a steady recovery in 2003, reaching $2.3 billion in total volume. Among its top five trading partners, four of them are members of the six-party talks, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia ($115 million) respectively.
Unlike the trade statistics, foreign investment figures are not well compiled for a couple of reasons. One is the sporadic nature of investment, which is often subject to political factors inside and outside of North Korea. In the ’90s, for instance, driven by the launch of Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP), the Rajin-Sunbong Special Economic Zone initially recorded $700 million worth of contracted investment. However, due to its unfavorable economic environment for both political and economic reasons, the actual investment was limited to $8.8 million.44 The other reason is that the size of many investments is too small to be reflected in the “mirror statistics.” In addition, investment has been often disguised by such terms as “cooperation,” as is the case with inter-Korean economic relations. The South Korean government prefers to dub its economic investments “cooperation” due to the lack of reciprocity in its nature. Furthermore, it was not until 1998 that the North allowed South Korean investment by law. Nonetheless, investment by those who can make them without legal constraints, such as China and South Korea, has been on a steady rise. Since 1999, a South Korean conglomerate Hyundai Asan, for instance, has invested approximately $833 million in such projects as tour of Mount Keumgang, Kaesung Industrial Compound, and similar projects. At the governmental level, the South is due to have invested about $25.1 million in the Compound when completed in 2005. In addition, the ongoing effort to reconnect the interrupted railroads between the two countries is estimated to cost about $33.4 million. Furthermore, the South is in the midst of discussion with its northern counterpart for its potential investment in SOC, which is estimated to be in the range of $111 million. In recent times, China has been active in the pursuit of tapping the North’s market. In 2003, the two countries established a designated company that was authorized to manage the commercial and investment related matters at civilian level. Since then, a Chinese mining company announced it signed a contract to invest about $2.4 billion in Hyesan copper mine for development and production. Furthermore, China has been extensively seeking investment opportunities in service industries such as hotels and residential complex as well as department stores.45
One advantage for Chinese investors is their uninhibited geographical freedom for investment, whereas the Koreans are strictly limited to designated areas. Beginning in 1995, regional states began to provide humanitarian aid and other economic assistance to North Korea as the result of the successive famines and ensuing economic consequences, as well as seeking a solution to the first nuclear crisis.46 To worsen the situation, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, once the largest and most reliable source of aid and assistance to the North, meant desperate need for a replacement. It was, then, when the regional states of Northeast Asia stepped in to join China to help the North Koreans survive malnutrition and mass death-by-hunger inflicted by its chronic food shortages. From June 1995 to June 2003, statistics revealed by the Korean Ministry of Unification state that South Korea’s total accumulated aid and assistance stood at $535 million, which would be later modified to $568 million as of the end of 2002.47 According to the same data, the US has provided $650 million of aid and assistance, while US statistics claim over $1 billion was provided (about 60% of which has taken the form of food aid and about 40 percent in form of energy assistance).48 China49 and Japan, according to the same statistics, have both accumulated a total of $250 million worth of aid and assistance,50 while the EU provided a total of $295 million. If the trend continues, it would mean for the North an annual level of support of $1-1.1 billion of aid and assistance for food, KEDO, and others alike.51
Under the circumstances, the prospects for continued US sanctions against North Korea do not seem bright. The case particularly does not meet the conditions to be effective. There is a set of conditions in which sanctions are regarded to be effective and useful as a tool of influence. First, sanctions will be effective against a target country that has no other available trading partners. Alternate trading partners cannot, therefore, maintain the availability of a market for the target’s exports and may allow the importation of necessary items. Second, sanctions will be more effective against a free market economy than a command one like North Korea where the prices of scarce goods do not necessarily respond to the shortage inflicted by imposed sanctions. Third, sanctions are less likely to be effective if the target country is not dependent on foreign goods that cannot be replaced by domestic industries. Fourth, sanctions are effective unless they do not create large costs to the imposing state. Fifth, the efficacy of sanctions is influenced by circumstances concerning the imposition and enforcement of sanctions.52 Thus, under the circumstances, the United States will have to give serious consideration as to whether it should lift its sanctions against North Korea. This is especially so if it is as serious as it has expressed in recent times about its hope that the six-party talks will continue and be fruitful.53 Removal of sanctions would be a long-term struggle for both the US executive branch and Congress, regardless of party and leadership. This is because of all the labels the US has attached to North Korea. It is an adversary state, an enemy that made the United States bleed in the 1950s. It is a rogue state, a designation it shares with six other states in the world because of their diplomatic behavior. 54
Because it is a communist, Marxist-Leninist state, it is barred from conducting any commercial or economic transaction with the US and from receiving foreign assistance from international financial institutions.55 For its active participation in terrorism, it is liable to further sanction. And last but not least, it is a member of the “axis of evil.”56 Under the circumstances, for the US to remove all these labels it has put on North Korea and to lift sanctions will be like peeling an onion skin, an endless task. Luckily enough, being an “axis of evil” member does not bind North Korea to any type of sanction by the US constitution or law—this particular label is nothing more than diplomatic rhetoric. By contrast, such labels as “rogue state” or “adversarial state” carry much more important implications for the prospect of relations between the United States and North Korea. The relationship is constrained by all and any legal means by the US. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the US has adopted too many sanctions against North Korea. In fact, the first sanction was adopted before the war ended, in 1951.As a sanction against a non-market state, the Trade Framework Extension Act of 1951 was applied to North Korea. That act required the suspension of MFN trade status.57 Ever since then, North Korea has been embargoed with many more types of sanction. First, since it posed a threat to US national security, North Korea was subject to the Trading with the Enemy Act and National Emergencies Act. In the wake of the Korean War, the United States invoked a total embargo on exports to North Korea. Over the years, export controls were restated as the Export
Administration Regulations (EARs). According to this restriction, North Korea was classified as a member of Country Group Z, the most restricted lot.58 In 1989, the EARs were modified to allow the export to North Korea of commercially supplied goods intended to meet basic human needs. Shipment of these goods required validation on a case-by-case basis. In September 1999, former US president Bill Clinton formally announced the removal of most export restrictions applied to North Korea, at least in theory.59 Second, North Korea has long been regarded as a state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism, pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979. Third, for being a Marxist-Leninist state, it is subject to the Export- Import Bank Act of 1945, and is further restricted under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. One of the main features of these acts is that the United States is required by law to oppose membership in international financial institutions and refuse financial support to terrorist states, including North Korea. Fourth, pursuant to its label as a rogue state for proliferating weapons of mass destruction, North Korea has been made subject to the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979, and the Iran Proliferation Act of 2000. According to the Arms Export Control Act, the United States bans “export, directly or indirectly, of any munitions item, lease or loan, credits, guarantees, or other financial assistance to a terrorist country.” It further “prohibits US individuals from engaging in such trade or support of such a country.”60
For all these legal constraints to be removed and to bring peace to the bilateral relationship between the US and North Korea, the key is obviously in the United States’ hands. If we truly understand the long and winding process for amending a law in US politics, not too many of us can blame Pyongyang for relying on unconventional bargaining tactics for its survival. Whether North Korea knows the US political system well enough to employ such preconditions for its participation in the six-party talks is not clear. However, if we were to look at the other side of the coin, the US may be well aware of the true meanings of the layers it has put on North Korea. Of all the aforementioned sanctions, for instance, there are some surprising, yet convincing and persuasive, argument by some scholars as to why North Korea should be cleared of being labeled as a terrorist state, and the related sanctions. Their rationale relates to the North’s inactive engagement in terrorism in recent times, and in the fact that such labeling is deliberately distorted and misinterpreted. Thus, they argue that at least North Korea should be emancipated from such sanctions.61
If its unwillingness to even considers lifting any of these sanctions is any indicator of its current North Korean policy, it may imply that it feels better off with the status quo than with a peaceful solution to the current crisis. Perhaps Washington feels that dragging out the crisis will eventually xhaust its opponent to the point of surrender. In the meantime, the US would be able to shift
the momentum toward its own side and turn the course to its favor, thereby allowing itself to achieve its domestic and international goals (TMD, WTO, energy and alike), not what other perceive as more important, such as formal peace on the Korean Peninsula built by the consequences of the talks and its subsequent institutionalization.
IV. Feasibility of Institutionalization: A Theoretical AssessmentDespite more than a decade long effort by the Northeast Asian states to build a multilateral security regime based on cooperation and dialogue, the only results have been at the non-governmental, Track II level. Indeed, a number of Track II level meetings, such as CSCAP and NEACD are in operation to date. Nonetheless, the traditional school of (neo-) realism still prevails to hinder regional states from realizing this end. Relative gains theory is still very much at work in their foreign policy thinking due to their lack of confidence and trust caused by historical problems, differences in social and political values and systems, and diverse cultural backgrounds. The eruption of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, caused by the North’s confession in October 2002 of operating a highly enriched uranium (HEU) development program, however, has had a compelling effect on the regional states and the US to come to a consensus on the necessity to approach and solve the matter in multilateral context, thereby successfully launching what is now known as the “six-party talks.” To date, although the talks have been held on only three occasions, interest in their further development and transformation into an institution has already surfaced. The idea of institutionalization of the talks was, ironically enough, first put forward by China, who, in the early stage of the crisis, was indifferent to the idea of dealing with North Korea’s nuclear issue in a multilateral context. Should the institutionalization of the talks come to fruition, it would have much greater implications for multilateral security cooperation paradigm than becoming the first of such kind in Northeast Asia.
First of all, unlike the conventional realist wisdom of prior fulfillment of necessary prerequisites, or post hoc and ad hoc qualifications such as geography, history, perception, domestic politics, confidence and trust, multilateral security cooperation is not impossible with an outbreak of a serious national security threat like development of nuclear weapons, if and when threatened nations all oppose that threat. Under such a predicament, the possibility of such a threat becoming a cause for aggressive war against prevailing defensive technologies is low, 62 thereby naturally refuting the realists’ claim on a state’s preference for relative gains than cooperation in an anarchic world.63 Second, cooperation as self-help is applicable to meet the international challenge of a potential threat if and when that threat is perceived to be for economic gains rather than political. According to Charles L. Glaser in his work of cooperation as self-help, “an adversary will engage in reciprocal restraint only if arms control promises to provide it with greater security than the competitive alternatives.” By the same logic, inducement of an adversary to cooperation is feasible by a state by relying on its own resources, since the state’s “ability to engage in an arms race is a central condition for its adversary’s belief that arms racing is risky, and thus for its willingness to cooperate.”64 Under the circumstances, since the intention of North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy is not oriented toward expansion of influence (hegemony) or territory to maximize security as the offensive realism would dictate, and it is rather geared toward other “important motives in addition to security,”65 its non-security motives like “greed” are more effectively and efficiently managed through cooperation than one or two individual states trying to take up all the economic burden as witnessed in the failure of the subsequent implementation of the Agreed Framework.
Third, lack of confidence and trust induces states to seek a credible line of communication when confronted with an imminent threat and if that threat is primarily motivated by political and economic reasons. It is particularly the case with the North Korean nuclear crisis because the same actors have already experienced an unpleasant precedent, in which lack of trust and confidence literally prevented the Agreed Framework from living up to its expectations. Given lack of trust and confidence among the signatory states of the Framework, the causes for its failure are not certain to date. While the North would blame the US, and vice-versa, for not sufficiently fulfilling the responsibilities laid out in the Framework, such a blame game had only disallowed any progress toward its goal. One lesson certainly stands out: bilateral agreement between the states that do not have trust and confidence in each other never work out. Taking this experience into the second case of the crisis, concerned nations naturally may have realized that there must be a strong witness stance for any type of solution reached by the distrusted parties to be effective. Furthermore, if the nations all assume an objective and unbiased role of self-witnesses for the efficacy of the agreed solution, self-interested benefits are naturally generated from such cooperation, thereby facilitating further cooperation to develop in the form of institution.66 Thus, the Northeast Asian region may now be equipped with right conditions for an inception of multilateral security cooperation institution. As emphasized by several institutionalists, conditional factors “such as the number of major actors in the system and whether military advantage favors offense or defense”67 are clear in the region. In addition, the regional actors are well aware that the relative gains are “unlikely to have much impact on cooperation if the potential absolute gains (i.e., peace and avoiding a nuclear arms race) from cooperation are substantial or in any context involving more than two states.”68 Under the premises, institutionalization of the talks may not all seem too distant, if not timely. As China once stated, institutionalization could play a positive role in sustaining the talks. Furthermore, it could also help it from falling into a sudden and abrupt end, as in the “four-party talks” in the late 1990s. When a solution is found, and will be implemented, institution can also prevent a solution from experiencing another breakdown as the Framework did. In short, to uphold the currently loose, yet fragile, format of multilateralism, institutionalization of the talks may be an alternative.
V. ConclusionDespite its short existence, but based on the valuable lessons from previous experiences, there is a consensus on the necessities for institutionalization of the current six-party talks emerging among the concerned nations of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The timing of such a call may be debatable as the gap of differences in opinion on the methodology of solution between the two core states, the United States and North Korea, seems to only widen. According to the conventional theory of multilateral cooperation, the current distrust between the two states cannot bring the idea of institutionalization of the talks to fruition. However, as the nations of Northeast Asia has made an unprecedented congregation for security reason, they may have led themselves into a land of opportunity that can be utilized to achieve a much bigger end, establishing an institutionalized multilateral cooperative security system. Regardless of the format of such system, i.e., regime, organization, or institution, an institution that is legally binding with superintendent-like authority over the implementation of what they have adopted as solution would enhance the talks’ efficacy in achieving its goals and purposes. Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a long and winding process, by which all the nations involved cannot avoid high economic and political consequences that can only be solved in sufficient and efficient manner via cooperation. The economic price for North Korea’s renunciation of nuclear pursuits is too steep for a nation to bear by itself. Political challenges naturally arise from lack of trust and confidence, which could cause, once again, whatever solution is adopted to fall into the trap of stagnation and stalemate in its implementation.
The success of the above scheme, therefore, lies in the decisions and actions taken by the United States regarding the North’s survival both in political and economic terms. As witnessed at the second round of the six-party talks, regardless of the status of the talks, China, South Korea and Russia expressed their willingness to give a helping hand to the North. Only the
United States and Japan had reservations against such a call, because they are prevented by their laws from providing aid and assistance to North Korea. Under the circumstances, and if the talks are to see any positive consequences, the time has arrived for the US to give some serious thought to the obstacles that prevent it from making an effective deal with the North. This approach is feasible if the US can reemploy its “trust but verify” tactic applied to the Soviet Union during the Reagan era.69 Some may argue that North Korea can free the international community from all the burdens and challenges by following the Libyan model. However, such claim tends to overlook one important and critical factor that differentiates the cases fundamentally. Libya was not a threat to peace and stability of its region as well as those of the neighboring states, nor did it have as much security importance at both the global and regional level as does the North. Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference in the motivation behind the North’s and Libya’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. While the former did so for the sake of national survival, the latter relied on it to achieve its diplomatic end, that is, to gain an upper hand in its struggle against imperialism. Thus, the economic and political toll taken on the immediate neighbors may well be much higher in the former case than the latter’s, thereby forcing the states to adopt a different strategy in their approach to the matter—cooperation in multilateral institutional context.
AcknowledgementsThe author is grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable and critical comments on the earlier draft and the editor’s support. Dr. Choo would also like to thank East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore and its library for their kind support to the completion of the article. He gratefully acknowledges valuable suggestions from Wang Gungwu, Tang Shiping,
Lai Hongyin, and Lam Peng Er.
Notes
1. Kim Ick Do and Lee Dae Woo, Modern Chinese Politics (Busan: Busan University Press, 2003) p.479.
2. Michael Yahuda, “How much has China learned about Interdependence,” in David. S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (NY: Routledge, 1999)pp. 6-26; Jianwei Wang, “Managing Conflict: Chinese Perspectives on Multilateral Diplomacy and Collective Security,” in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World, (NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 83; and Sukhee Han, “ARF and China: A Review on Enmeshment of China,” The Korean Journal of International Relations, 42:4, 2002, p.375. China on loose multilateralism, see Zhu Feng, “Guanyu quyuzhuyu yu quanqiuzhuyi (Regionalism and Globalism),” Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations, pp. 41-46.
3. Yu Bin, “China’s Dilemma in Tackling N. Korea Crisis,” Strait Times, February 18, 2003; John Pompfret and Glenn Kessler, “China’s Reluctance on N. Korea Irks U.S.,” Washington Post, February 4, 2003, Page A20; Joseph Kahn, “To China, North Korea Looks Radioactive,” New York Times, February 2, 2003; Time Plate, “Beijing Worries about U.S. Designs on the Korean Peninsula,”Asia Pacific Media Network, January 27, 2003; Antonaeta Bezlova, “Beijing’s influence on North Korea overstated,” Asia Times, January 11, 2003; Jasper Becker, “China’s influence is limited,” International Herald Tribune, January 10, 2003; and Tom Plate, “Can Chinese diplomacy turn over a new card?” Straits Times, January 4, 2003.
4. Mathew Forney, “Family Feud: China vs. North Korea,” Time, December 23, 2003; John Rudwitch, “China Cranks up Diplomacy over Korean Nuclear Row,” Reuters, July 6, 2003; Antoaneta Bezlova, “China gets tougher with North Korea,” Asia Times, April 10, 2003; and John Pomfret,“China Urges N. Korea Dialogue,” Washington Post, April 4, 2003, page A 16.
5. David Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 43-56.
6. “Chaoxian hewenti heren jieling ‘ezhe’ shi zhong dubo? (Why does ‘containing’ North Korea for its nuclear problem make people think it is a gamble?)” Zonglun tianxia (www.people.com.cn/GB/
guoji/24/20021230/898126.html) (accessed on January 12, 2003).
7. “Zhongguo nirang liufanghuitan zhiduhua (China plans to institutionalize six-party talks),” Fenghuangwang(www.pheonixtv.com.cn), November 20, 2003.
8. John Barry Kotch, “Six Party Talks: The Way Forward,” Korea Observer, Vol.36, No.1, Spring 2005, p. 186.
9. Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach, “Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange,” International Organization, Vol.55, No.4, Autumn 2001, p.891.
10. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, Vol.55, No.4, Autumn 2001,
11. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” op. cit. p. 762 (emphasis added).
12. David Lake, “Beyond Annarch: The Importance of Security Institutions,” International Security, Vol.26, No.1, Summer 2001, pp. 129-160.
13. Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach, “Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange,” op. cit. pp. 819-917.
14. For a detailed account for North Korea’s victimization by externalities, see Zhang Xizhen and Eugene Brown, “Policies toward North Korea: a time for new thinking,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.9, No.25, 2000, pp. 535-545; and Korean Central News Agency, “US to Blame for Derailing Process of Denuclearisation on Korean Peninsula,” Yaleglobal Online (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=1608) 12 May, 2003 (accessed on July 7, 2005).Choo 55
15. Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach, Ibid., pp. 892-893.
16. Michael O’Hanlon, “Wanted: A Roadmap for North Korea,” Yaleglobal Online (http://
yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=5837) (accessed on July 7, 2005); Zhang Xizhen and Eugene Brown, “Policies toward North Korea: a time for new thinking”; John Barry Kotch, “Six Party Talks: The Way Forward.”
17. “Zhongguo nirang liufanghuitan zhiduhua (China plans to institutionalize six-party talks),” Fenghuangwang(www.pheonixtv.com.cn), November 20, 2003.
18. Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for rivalry: Prospects for peace in multipolar Asia,” International Security, Vol.18, No. 3, (Winter 1993/94), pp. 1-56.
19. Jack Pritchard, “Beyond Six-party talks: An opportunity to establish a framework for multilateral cooperation in the North Pacific,” paper presented at NORPAC Hokkaido Conference for North Pacific Issues, October 7, 2004, p. 6.
20. “Spokesmen of MOFA: I hope the six-party talks institutionalized,” Renmin Ribao, February 25, 2004. For a scholastic point of view, please refer to Jiang Xiyuan, “DPRK Nuke Problem and New Framework of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” SIIS Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4, November 2003, pp. 24-37; Pang Zhongying, “Building Regional Security System,” China Daily,
March 26, 2004, and “Building a Regional Security Mechanism,” PacNet (Pacific Forum CSIS), No. 13A, April 5, 2004; and Jaewoo Choo, “China’s Plans for a Regional Security Forum,” Asia Times, October 17, 2003.
21. Vitality of confidence and trust to the institutionalization of multilateralism is well depicted in the
following materials: Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospect for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security, Vol.18, No.3 (Winter 1993/4), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” International Security,Vol.18, No.3, pp. 34-77; Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Source of Stable Multipolarity,” International Security, Vol.23, No.2 (Fall 1998), pp. 62-66; Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the Containment of China,” International Security, Vol.20, No.(Spring 1996) pp. 107-135; and Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, “A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-System in Asia,” Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London:International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).
22. A view tend to agree on this note is particularly shared by Jonathan D. Pollack when he relates one of the causes for the failure of the Agreement Framework to the lack of institutionalism. See Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review, Vol. VI, No.3, (Summer 2003), pp. 1-34.
23. Andrew Mack, “Security cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and prospects,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 1992; Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospect for Peace in a Multipolar Asia” ; and Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United
States after the Cold War.”
24. A study the negative impact that such perception has had on the inter-Korean relations as well as on
the former ‘four-party talks’ in the late 1990s is well depicted in Jin-Hyun Paik, “Building Peace
Regime on the Korean Peninsula: Analysis and Assessment of Two Korea’s Perspectives on Peace
Regime-Building,” IFANS Review, 3:4 (Seoul: The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security,
August 1995), pp. 14-15.
25. Past high hopes by the Chinese scholars on the prospect of the four-party talks is well depicted
Ding Shizhuan and Li Qiang, “Chaoxianbandao heping jizhi jiqi qianjing (Prospects for a peace
structure on the Korean peninsula),” Xiandai guoji guanxi(Contemporary International Relations),
April 1999, pp. 42-44.
26. The purpose of this paper is not to rehash the ‘who did not do what’ between the US and North
Korea with respect to the due implementation of the Agreed Framework, and thus will avoid to deal
with the matter here. Many analytical literatures on the North Korea’s failure to fulfill its obligations
and responsibility are easily found. Gregory Elich, “Targeting North Korea,” (http://
www.globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI212A.html) (accessed on December 31, 2002). However, irresponsible
aspect on the US’ part is dealt in a limited number of literatures. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming
Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton Paperbacks, 1998).
27. Ralph A. Cossa, “Six-party talks: Conditions for Success,” (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/
EK13Dg04.html) (accessed on November 13, 2003).
28. Kyunghyang Shinmun, (http://www.khan.co.kr/news/2000/06/12/20000612001632.html) (accessed
on June 12, 2000).
29. For its Doimoi policy (reform policy), Vietnam, for instance, was able to receive 1.6 billion dollars
in ODA and 2.2 billion US dollars in FDI. Joong Ang Daily, April 24, 2004.
30. There are five executive directors in World Bank, for instance, who are appointed by the members
with the five largest numbers of shares (currently the United States, Japan, Germany, France and
the United Kingdom). The other Executive Directors are elected by the other members. In IFC and
IDA, Executive Directors and Alternates of the Bank serve ex-officio as Executive Directors and
Alternates of IFC and IDA (as long as the country that appoints them, or any one of the countries
that have elected them, is also a member of IFC and IDA). Members of the MlGA Board of
Directors are elected separately. (http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extaboutus/organization/
bodext/0,contentMDK:50004945~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~
theSitePK:278036,00.html) (accessed on September 25, 2004).
31. Although the idea of institutionalizing the six-party talks may have been first put forward by the
Chinese government, however, theoretical assessment has been actively pursued by American
scholars. Balbina Y. Hwang, for instance, was one of the early advocates on the extension of
multilateral cooperation opportunity to the regional states. Balbina Y. Hwang, “Resolving the North
Korean nuclear crisis,” Executive Memorandum, (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, May
8, 2003) No. 875. For others, read, Jack Pritchard, “Beyond Six-party talks.”
32. Kimberly Ann Elliot, “Economic Leverage and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” International
Economics Policy Briefs, Number PB03-3 (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics,
April 2003), p. 3.
33. B.C. Koh, “Six-Party Talks: Round 3,” Policy Forum Only (http://www.nautilus.org/for a/security/
0426A_Koh.html) (accessed on December 20, 2004). For a detailed explanation on the concept of
CVID, read Ralph A. Cossa, “CVID: Does Everyone Agree?” PacNet, No. 20, May 6 2004.
34. Balbina Y. Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” Backgrounder No. 1679 (Washington
DC: The Heritage Foundation, August 25, 2003);
35. Mark E. Manyin, “Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues,” CRS Report for Congress
(Washington DC: The Library of Congress, November 26, 2003), p. 4-6.
36. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “A ‘Master Plan’ to deal with North Korea,” Policy Brief #114 (Washington
DC: The Brookings Institution, January 2003), p. 2.
37. Although it was in 1986 when the Vietnamese government adopted a Doimoi(open-door) policy,
the US’ embargo was not lifted till 1994 as a result of the continuous pressure from American
business community who became obsessed with its loosing the competition edge against other
western counterparts’ not only in the Vietnamese domestic market but also in its natural and energy
resource market. See Kelly S. Nelson, “US-Vietnamese Relations,” Asian Affairs, an American
Review, Vol.19, No.1, Spring 1992, pp. 49-60, especially p. 51 and p. 53.
38. Considering the secrecy involved in the talks and negotiations with Britain for nine months, the
Libyan model may be much more applicable and feasible if the standing nuclear crisis is dealt at the
bilateral, instead of multilateral, level like in 1993 and 1994. Some dubbed such an approach as
“reciprocal unilateral measures,” independent action taken by parties to the negotiations to reach
their shared objectives. For details, see James E. Goodby and Donald G. Gross, “The ‘Libya
Model’ Could Help Disarm North Korea, International Herald Tribune, September 3, 2004. An
opposing view is well analyzed in Paul Kerr, “Libya’s Disarmament: A Model for U.S. Policy?”
Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 5 June 2004, pp. 36-38.
39. The latest survey on the issues was rather focused on the Korean college students. The result
revealed that to date 48.9% share the view that the cause of the current North Korean nuclear crisis
is due to the US’ hard line policy, whereas 29.9% see it underlying in the North’s provocative
intention. The survey was conducted by the National Unification Movement Headquarters of the
Young Korean Academy between October 25 and 29, 2004, and was released on November 25,
2004 in Ohmynews of Korea, an online newspaper(www.ohmynews.co.kr) (accessed on December
10, 2004.) Another poll by the South Korean people showed that while 75% think the North has
nuclear weapons, 62% does not see it as a threat. Joong-Ang Daily, September 30, 2004.
40. Such is the case felt by a growing number of foreign scholars with their contacts and interviews
with the Chinese counterparts. However, a much more creditable cause for such an impression can
be attributed on the Chinese ambiguous and subtle explanation of their policy of the nuclear free
Korean peninsula as well as their policy objective for the six-party talks. Nuclear free peninsula is
often referred as a condition of not having nuclear weapons, not of having ambition or development
Choo 57
program. To many Chinese, it has been already realized with the removal of the US nuclear
weapons from South Korea in the early 90s. In addition, the Chinese active pursuit for a multilateral
dialogue on the issue is rather out of their national interests, such as preventing the case from falling
into warfare. On this particular point, see Zhu Feng, “China’s Policy on the North Korean Nuclear
Issue,” China Strategy, Vol. 3 (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July
20, 2004), pp. 5-10, and Guo Feixiong, “China’s Role and Objectives in the North Korean Nuclear
Crisis,” Ibid., pp. 11-16.
41. Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,” Policy Review, No. 127, Oct/Nov 2004, p.
28.
42. The trade statistics shown in this article is limited to the total figure of ordinary trade - border trade,
processing trade, bonded trade, grant-type aid, and others are excluded. The impact of China’s
accession to WTO on its trade with North Korea is manifested in the dramatic rise of the growth rate
in its ordinary trade: 136% in export and 43.6% in import between 2002 and 2003. While North
Korea’s processing export showed a 99% increase in the same period, its import recorded a
decrease of 5.9%. Border trade between the two also saw a relatively mild increase for North Korea
(47.9%) and China (15.4%). Of the North’s total export to China, 70.4% came from bonded export.
Meanwhile, majority of China’s total export volume (68.7%) was conducted in an ordinary fashion
(trade). See North Korea’s Trade Report 2003 released by KOTRA, (http://www.kotra.or.kr/main/
trade/nk/research/sub10.jsp) (accessed on August 22, 2004).
43. Kwang-il Kim, Sino-North Korean Trade in the First Half 2004, (Seoul: KOTRA, 2004), p. 2.
44. TRADP, Tumen Unpdate, Issue 1, May 1999, p. 10.
45. For more detailed information regarding Chinese economic activities in North Korea, read an
interview article with Professor Xu Jiwen of Jilin University, Shenyang Jinbao, August 16, 2004.
46. Dong Hwi Lee, “US’ Economic Sanctions against North Korea: Chances to Lift and Its Implications,”
Juyo gukje munje bunseok (International Problems Analysis), 1996-25 (July 1996), pp. 4-5.
47. Yonhap News, September 11, 2003. Hyung-joong Park, “A Scenario on Inter-Korean Relations
and North Korean Assistance in Solving the Nuclear Problem Process,” East Asian Review, Winter
2003, pp. 1-17, especially pp. 5-6.
48. Mark E. Manyin, “Assessing US Assistance to North Korea,” American Asian Review, Vol. XXI,
No. 3, Fall 2003, pp. 29-69.
49. In addition, China is estimated to provide 80% of the North Korea’s energy needs. Please refer to
“February 25, 2003 Secretary of State Press Briefing on Board Plane en Route Elmendorf,”
(www.state.gob/secretary/rm/) (accessed on April 24, 2003).
50. According to Eberstadt’s findings, however, China’s implicit aid to North Korea between 1998-
2003 fell from about $340 million to about $270 million, with the total recovering to $340 million
in 2003. See Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,” Ibid., p. 32.
51. Hyung-joong Park, “A Scenario on Inter-Korean Relations and North Korean Assistance in Solving
the Nuclear Problem Process,” p. 17.
52. Paul Vanwagenen, “U.S. Economic Sanctions-Non-traditional Success against North Korea,” Law
and Policy in International Business, Vol.32, No.1, Fall 2000, p. 252.
53. Dong-A Ilbo, January 17, 2005 (accessed on January 19, 2005). Michael O’Hanlon and Mike
Mochizuki, “Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No
.2, Autumn 2003, p. 12.
54. For study on the concept of rogue state, please refer to Noam Chomsky, “Rogue States,” (http://
www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/z9804-rogue.html) (accessed on August 20, 2004).
55. Diane E. Rennack, “North Korea: Economic Sanctions,” Report for Congress (updated January 24, 2003), (http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31696.pdf) (accessed on June 23, 2004), p. 1.
56. 2002 State of Union Address by George W. Bush, January 2002.
57. Rennack, “North Korea: Economic Sanctions,” Report for Congress, p. 8.
58. Rennack, Ibid., p. 6.
59. “Clinton relaxes U.S. sanctions against North Korea,” CNN, September 18, 1999 (http://cgi.cnn.com/
ASIANOW/east/9909/17/n.korea.01/) (accessed on September 24, 2004).
60. Rennack, pp. 6-12.
61. Daniel A. Pinston and Phillip C. Saunders, “Seeing North Korea Clearly,” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 3, September 2003, p. 92; and James Miles, “Waiting Out North Korea,” Survival, Vol. 44, No. 3,Summer 2002, p. 42.
62. John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol.19, No.3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 23-25.
63. John J. Mearsheimer particularly shares this view when he states that “states in a realist world …must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation,” John J.Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” Ibid., p. 12.
64. Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/5), pp. 58-59.
65. Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” Ibid., p. 55.
66. Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 42.
67. See David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (NY:Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 323.
68. Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726.
69. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “A ‘Master Plan’ to deal with North Korea,” Policy Brief #114, p. 3.
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