This is absurd, why the UN Security council has not explictly expressed "Shock" over the killing of innocent civilians and the relentless firing of rockets-which have practically held Jewish citizens hostage by Hezbollah? Is the UN fair?
Sunday, July 30, 2006
U.N. Council: 'Shock' Over Lebanon Deaths
This is absurd, why the UN Security council has not explictly expressed "Shock" over the killing of innocent civilians and the relentless firing of rockets-which have practically held Jewish citizens hostage by Hezbollah? Is the UN fair?
Friday, July 28, 2006
Israel vows to avoid Hezbollah trap in Lebanon
"Israel is going to do it at our own pace, at our own time, to make sure that when we go in, we go in carefully, and that we don't walk into their booby-traps," Israeli government spokeswoman Miri Eisin said. "We want to stop the rocket fire, but we also want to make sure that Hezbollah will not be there afterward."
Thursday, July 27, 2006
Million Dollar Question Click here for more on UBL
Where is the front line of the global war on terrorism?
Keep comments short readers!
Israel Determined to Smoke Out the Hezs'
"Hezbollah must not in the future be what it has been in the past," Peretz said. "This may take time and it may take more force. We have both in plenty."
"We will not agree for Hezbollah flags again to fly in our faces on the northern border," he said.
Wednesday, July 26, 2006
Iranian Volunteers Set Off for Lebanon Click here for more
One volunteer was quoted saying"We are just the first wave of Islamic warriors from Iran," said Amir Jalilinejad, chairman of the Student Justice Movement, a nongovernment group that helped recruit the fighters. "More will come from here and other Muslim nations around the world. Hezbollah needs our help."
How do we solve the Middle East Crisis?
For weeks the IDF has been engaged in a furious strikes on Hezbollah bases in Southern Lebanon. Despite the intense battle, the IDF and Hezbollah seem be committed to another several weeks of fighting. Ironic the incident that bigan as a rescue mission to bring back two Israel soldiers---has caused more death and suffering and the kidnapped soldiers are still missing.
Talks of some diplomatic solution have been heard and gone, today in Rome-participants agreed to disagree. In the foreseeable future there is no way out. The United States stands firm with her ally Israel, on the other side, the European, Asian and African countries prefer some form of cease fire to allow some diplomatic track to take hold.
Both these diplomatic strategies have drawbacks, first, the United States hopes in a few weeks the Jewish state will be able to defeat Hezbollah, thus making possible for the proposed international force to take over its responsibilties. In theory, the US strategy looks good, however, it is possible that the conflict will take longer than anticipated by both US and IDF. God forbid--is this happens our troops could be drawn into this conflict help defeat Hezbollah or to lead the so-called multi-national force. Consequently, the Arab streets will be hijacked by extremist eager to show Western ruthlessness and bias in dealing with Arabs and muslims in particular.
The other strategy promoted by the UN and other countries call for a cease-fire before any long term solutions could be worked out. The problem with this approach is that the Jewish state and the US both are opposed to such a design as nothing but a ploy to prolong and weaken international attention on Hezbollah. If this strategy succeeds however, the innocent victims of war could be reduced and the demage inflicted on Lebanese social and economic infrustructure stopped. Yet in the long-run, the Hezbollah threat would not be decisively reduced by this plan, a prelude to another confrotation.
Overall, the US-Israel plan has better prospects for peace and long-time benefits. The other alternative, is important temporarily to halting fighting, but leaves serious issues unresolved.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE
We need to give the IDF's sufficient but limited opportunity to destory the Hezbollah. In the meantime, the UN and the rest of the world should be resolving issues associated with organizing the peace enfocement force. The force to be effective would need to disarm-forcefully if necessary the remaining pockets of terrorist, supervise shipments entering Lebanon thru Syria and other areas, train and empower Lebanese forces for future border patrol responsibilties and engage combat ready games to all possible contigencies.
Diplomatically, the terrorist threat posed by Iran and Syria need to be addressed promptly at the UN and other bilateral arragements (mainly be EU. Ideally, several instruments must be utilized, for example sanction and threat of military force.
In short, the problem possed by Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations in the region represent a global confrotation between the West and Islamic radicalism. Therefore, we can only arrest this trend if the world led by the West, Allies and moderate Arab governments come together, as a single--coherent bloc determined to vaquish and bankrupt terrorist-rogue-network states such as Iran and Syria.
Talks of some diplomatic solution have been heard and gone, today in Rome-participants agreed to disagree. In the foreseeable future there is no way out. The United States stands firm with her ally Israel, on the other side, the European, Asian and African countries prefer some form of cease fire to allow some diplomatic track to take hold.
Both these diplomatic strategies have drawbacks, first, the United States hopes in a few weeks the Jewish state will be able to defeat Hezbollah, thus making possible for the proposed international force to take over its responsibilties. In theory, the US strategy looks good, however, it is possible that the conflict will take longer than anticipated by both US and IDF. God forbid--is this happens our troops could be drawn into this conflict help defeat Hezbollah or to lead the so-called multi-national force. Consequently, the Arab streets will be hijacked by extremist eager to show Western ruthlessness and bias in dealing with Arabs and muslims in particular.
The other strategy promoted by the UN and other countries call for a cease-fire before any long term solutions could be worked out. The problem with this approach is that the Jewish state and the US both are opposed to such a design as nothing but a ploy to prolong and weaken international attention on Hezbollah. If this strategy succeeds however, the innocent victims of war could be reduced and the demage inflicted on Lebanese social and economic infrustructure stopped. Yet in the long-run, the Hezbollah threat would not be decisively reduced by this plan, a prelude to another confrotation.
Overall, the US-Israel plan has better prospects for peace and long-time benefits. The other alternative, is important temporarily to halting fighting, but leaves serious issues unresolved.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE
We need to give the IDF's sufficient but limited opportunity to destory the Hezbollah. In the meantime, the UN and the rest of the world should be resolving issues associated with organizing the peace enfocement force. The force to be effective would need to disarm-forcefully if necessary the remaining pockets of terrorist, supervise shipments entering Lebanon thru Syria and other areas, train and empower Lebanese forces for future border patrol responsibilties and engage combat ready games to all possible contigencies.
Diplomatically, the terrorist threat posed by Iran and Syria need to be addressed promptly at the UN and other bilateral arragements (mainly be EU. Ideally, several instruments must be utilized, for example sanction and threat of military force.
In short, the problem possed by Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations in the region represent a global confrotation between the West and Islamic radicalism. Therefore, we can only arrest this trend if the world led by the West, Allies and moderate Arab governments come together, as a single--coherent bloc determined to vaquish and bankrupt terrorist-rogue-network states such as Iran and Syria.
U.N. observers' deaths fuel diplomatic tension: Question of the Moment
Was Secretary General's statement calling the strike by IDF on the UN observers outpost in Southern Lebanon, killing four UN soldiers "apparently delibarate" hasty and irresponsible or appropriate?
ROME CONFERENCE ON LEBANON
Leaders and representatives of countries around the world are meeting in Rome to discuss how to bring an end to the conflict in Lebanon and ease the humanitarian crisis. Pressure is on to achieve a swift cease-fire, but disagreements are expected as the U.S. pushes for a longer term solution to conflict in the Middle East.
The conference gathers members of the "Lebanon Core Group," which consists of nations and organizations that want to help with the Middle East country's reconstruction and economic, political and social reforms.
Its members include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the World Bank, the European Union, Egypt, France, Russia, Britain, the United States, the United Nations and Italy. Spain, Germany and Turkey were also to attend.
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Israel is not represented.
The meeting is jointly chaired by Rice and Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema.
The agenda is to discuss how to end the current hostilities between Lebanon and Israel and finding a solution to the conflict. The humanitarian situation in the Lebanon will also be discussed alongside the situation in Cyprus, which is struggling to cope with the influx of evacuees. The death of four U.N. military observers in an Israeli attack is also likely to be on the agenda.
Possible soulutions, Arab and some European leaders are expected to push for an immediate cease-fire followed by the deployment of an international force. Pressure for a swift halt to hostilities has increased following the deadly bombing by Israel of a U.N. observation post.
According to The Associated Press, EU foreign and security affairs chief Javier Solana is expected to propose that a rapid reaction force be established, ideally be built around French, German and Spanish troops, supplemented by forces from Turkey, the Netherlands, Canada and Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
The Rome Conference produce no Agreement on Mideast Cease-Fire
Talks involving Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and counterparts from other countries bogged down Wednesday in apparent disagreement over what kind of cease-fire would be urged to end the Israeli-Hezbollah fighting.
Rice, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema joined Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora at a news conference. D'Alema said the participants agreed to work "immediately" for a cease-fire and Annan said any solution to the Mideast crisis should involve Iran and Syria.
Rice said the United States favors urgently ending the Israeli-Hezbollah fighting but that there cannot be a return to a status quo of political uncertainty and instability in Lebanon.
"There is much work to do and everyone has a role to play," Rice said.
A diplomat involved with the talks, who spoke on condition of anonymity about the ongoing negotiations, said international leaders were struggling to reach agreement on a statement about the violence between Israel and the Hezbollah militia.
Saniora gave an impassioned speech before the news conference that prodded the international leaders to continue working, the source said. The diplomat said the sticking point is language about the terms under which fighting would end.
The source insisted on anonymity because discussions on a conference resolution were still ongoing.
Almost every nation attending the conference in Rome has pressed Rice to call for an immediate end to the fighting on the Israeli-Lebanese border.
But Rice stood her ground in two days of diplomacy in Lebanon and Israel and the West Bank. Rather than a quick fix, she has repeatedly said the region needs enduring solutions, and other U.S. officials have raised doubts about an immediate cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah fighters in the south of Lebanon.
The Rome meeting of European and moderate Arab officials was to discuss the fighting sparked by the July 12 Hezbollah abduction of two Israeli soldiers. Rice attended a morning meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema before the international conference was set to begin.
When asked if she planned to announce an international force for Lebanon, Rice smiled and wouldn't comment.
In a statement at the start of the conference, Annan called for an immediate cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, calling for Hezbollah to stop its "deliberate targeting of Israeli population centers" and for Israel to end all bombing, blockades and ground operations.
He said "a key stipulation for such a halt in fighting would be that the parties must not, I repeat, must not take advantage of such a pause to conduct offense operations, redeploy or resupply."
And he said an international force will be vital to keeping peace.
Tuesday, July 25, 2006
Support Israel Petition -click here to participate
Israel is facing a crisis. We need to be sure that world leaders recognize Israel's right to exist within safe and secure borders, work to return Israel's kidnapped soldiers and pressure Hezbollah to stop their attacks on Israel.
This petition with your comments will be sent to the United Nations:
To: The Honorable Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Dear Mr. Secretary-General,
In light of the violence affecting the people of Israel and Lebanon, we respectfully ask that you join us in clearly and immediately reaffirming the right of Israel to defend its citizens and ensure its security in the face of relentless attacks, killings and kidnappings by Hezbollah.
We urge you to do everything in your power to help secure the release of Israel's abducted soldiers and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which requires establishing Lebanon's sovereignty and the authority of its government throughout the country; the disbanding and disarmament of all militias; and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the border with Israel.
Thank you for your attention.
This petition with your comments will be sent to the United Nations:
To: The Honorable Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Dear Mr. Secretary-General,
In light of the violence affecting the people of Israel and Lebanon, we respectfully ask that you join us in clearly and immediately reaffirming the right of Israel to defend its citizens and ensure its security in the face of relentless attacks, killings and kidnappings by Hezbollah.
We urge you to do everything in your power to help secure the release of Israel's abducted soldiers and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which requires establishing Lebanon's sovereignty and the authority of its government throughout the country; the disbanding and disarmament of all militias; and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the border with Israel.
Thank you for your attention.
Quote of the day
“It is urgent... but the framework is clearly to do this in a way that will help the Lebanese government exercise sovereignty over all of its territory.”
Rice urges ‘urgent and enduring’ Mideast peace
RAMALLAH, West Bank Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in a frenetic set of meetings amid Israeli-Hezbollah fighting, declared Tuesday the United States wants an “urgent and enduring” peace where problems are solved without war.
She also Rice said, “We need to get to a sustainable peace, there must be a way for people to reconcile their differences.”
Earlier, meeting in Jerusalem with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, she said the time has come for a new Middle East. “I have no doubt there are those who wish to strangle a democratic and sovereign Lebanon in its crib,” Rice said. “We, of course, also urgently want to end the violence.”
At this point, a multi-national force is the sole altanative to this abyss the Middle East finds itself in, and the resultant consequences.
She also Rice said, “We need to get to a sustainable peace, there must be a way for people to reconcile their differences.”
Earlier, meeting in Jerusalem with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, she said the time has come for a new Middle East. “I have no doubt there are those who wish to strangle a democratic and sovereign Lebanon in its crib,” Rice said. “We, of course, also urgently want to end the violence.”
At this point, a multi-national force is the sole altanative to this abyss the Middle East finds itself in, and the resultant consequences.
Monday, July 24, 2006
Question of The Week: The Mideast Conflict
What role should the United States play? Should UN or EU provide the International Peacekeeping force to supervise and if necessary engage Islamic terrorist in Southern Lebanon?
Please keep you answers short-thank you.
Please keep you answers short-thank you.
Hezbollah negotiator rejects peace proposal
Condi Rice was greeted with skeptism!
An official close to parliament speaker Nabih Berri said his talks with Rice failed to “reach an agreement because Rice insisted on one full package to end the fighting.”
The package included a cease-fire, simultaneous with the deployment of the Lebanese army and an international force in south Lebanon and the removal of Hezbollah weapons from a buffer zone extending 30 kilometers from the Israeli border, said the official. He spoke on condition of anonymity because the talks were private.
THE CHIEF DIPLOMAT IN THE MAKING
Dr. Condoleezza Rice became the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, commonly referred to as the National Security Advisor, on January 22, 2001.
In June 1999, she completed a six year tenure as Stanford University 's Provost, during which she was the institution's chief budget and academic officer. As Provost she was responsible for a $1.5 billion annual budget and the academic program involving 1,400 faculty members and 14,000 students.
As professor of political science, Dr. Rice has been on the Stanford faculty since 1981 and has won two of the highest teaching honors -- the 1984 Walter J. Gores Award for Excellence in Teaching and the 1993 School of Humanities and Sciences Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching.
At Stanford, she was a member of the Center for International Security and Arms Control from 1981-1986 (currently the Center for International Security And Cooperation), a Senior Fellow of the Institute for International Studies, and a Fellow (by courtesy) of the Hoover Institution. Her books include Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (1995) with Philip Zelikow, The Gorbachev Era (1986) with Alexander Dallin, and Uncertain Allegiance: The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army (1984). She also has written numerous articles on Soviet and East European foreign and defense policy, and has addressed audiences in settings ranging from the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Moscow to the Commonwealth Club to the 1992 and 2000 Republican National Conventions.
From 1989 through March 1991, the period of German reunification and the final days of the Soviet Union, she served in the Bush Administration as Director, and then Senior Director, of Soviet and East European Affairs in the National Security Council, and a Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In 1986, while an international affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, she served as Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1997, she served on the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender -- Integrated Training in the Military.
She was a member of the boards of directors for the Chevron Corporation, the Charles Schwab Corporation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the University of Notre Dame, the International Advisory Council of J.P. Morgan and the San Francisco Symphony Board of Governors. She was a Founding Board member of the Center for a New Generation, an educational support fund for schools in East Palo Alto and East Menlo Park, California and was Vice President of the Boys and Girls Club of the Peninsula . In addition, her past board service has encompassed such organizations as Transamerica Corporation, Hewlett Packard, the Carnegie Corporation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Rand Corporation, the National Council for Soviet and East European Studies, the Mid-Peninsula Urban Coalition and KQED, public broadcasting for San Francisco.
Born November 14, 1954 in Birmingham, Alabama, she earned her bachelor's degree in political science, cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Denver in 1974; her master's from the University of Notre Dame in 1975; and her Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver in 1981. She is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has been awarded honorary doctorates from Morehouse College in 1991, the University of Alabama in 1994, the University of Notre Dame in 1995, the National Defense University in 2002, the Mississippi College School of Law in 2003, the University of Louisville and Michigan State University in 2004. She resides in Washington, D.C.
In June 1999, she completed a six year tenure as Stanford University 's Provost, during which she was the institution's chief budget and academic officer. As Provost she was responsible for a $1.5 billion annual budget and the academic program involving 1,400 faculty members and 14,000 students.
As professor of political science, Dr. Rice has been on the Stanford faculty since 1981 and has won two of the highest teaching honors -- the 1984 Walter J. Gores Award for Excellence in Teaching and the 1993 School of Humanities and Sciences Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching.
At Stanford, she was a member of the Center for International Security and Arms Control from 1981-1986 (currently the Center for International Security And Cooperation), a Senior Fellow of the Institute for International Studies, and a Fellow (by courtesy) of the Hoover Institution. Her books include Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (1995) with Philip Zelikow, The Gorbachev Era (1986) with Alexander Dallin, and Uncertain Allegiance: The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army (1984). She also has written numerous articles on Soviet and East European foreign and defense policy, and has addressed audiences in settings ranging from the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Moscow to the Commonwealth Club to the 1992 and 2000 Republican National Conventions.
From 1989 through March 1991, the period of German reunification and the final days of the Soviet Union, she served in the Bush Administration as Director, and then Senior Director, of Soviet and East European Affairs in the National Security Council, and a Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In 1986, while an international affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, she served as Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1997, she served on the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender -- Integrated Training in the Military.
She was a member of the boards of directors for the Chevron Corporation, the Charles Schwab Corporation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the University of Notre Dame, the International Advisory Council of J.P. Morgan and the San Francisco Symphony Board of Governors. She was a Founding Board member of the Center for a New Generation, an educational support fund for schools in East Palo Alto and East Menlo Park, California and was Vice President of the Boys and Girls Club of the Peninsula . In addition, her past board service has encompassed such organizations as Transamerica Corporation, Hewlett Packard, the Carnegie Corporation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Rand Corporation, the National Council for Soviet and East European Studies, the Mid-Peninsula Urban Coalition and KQED, public broadcasting for San Francisco.
Born November 14, 1954 in Birmingham, Alabama, she earned her bachelor's degree in political science, cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Denver in 1974; her master's from the University of Notre Dame in 1975; and her Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver in 1981. She is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has been awarded honorary doctorates from Morehouse College in 1991, the University of Alabama in 1994, the University of Notre Dame in 1995, the National Defense University in 2002, the Mississippi College School of Law in 2003, the University of Louisville and Michigan State University in 2004. She resides in Washington, D.C.
Sunday, July 23, 2006
KIM Jong il has secret 'wife'
There is no official information available about the marital history of the 64-year-old leader of the highly secretive government, but Kim is widely believed to have been married three times. His last wife, Ko Yong Hi, reportedly died of cancer in 2004.
Since then, Kim has been living with Kim Ok, who had served as his personal secretary since the 1980s, Yonhap reported, citing South Korean government officials it didn't further identify.
Kim Ok, 42, "virtually acts as North Korea's first lady" and frequently accompanies the North Korean leader on his visits to military bases and in meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries, Yonhap said.
She also traveled with Kim Jong Il on a secretive trip to China in January, when she was received by Chinese officials as Kim's wife, the report said. Kim Ok also met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, it said.
It is not known whether Kim Ok and the North Korean leader have any children, Yonhap said.
Kim Jong Il is known to have three sons -- one from his second wife and two from his third. North Korean experts say Kim's 25-year-old son Kim Jong Chul is most likely to become the North's next leader.
His eldest son, Kim Jong Nam, is said to have fallen out of favor after embarrassing his father in 2001 when he was caught trying to enter Japan on a fake passport, saying he wanted to visit Tokyo Disneyland.
Since then, Kim has been living with Kim Ok, who had served as his personal secretary since the 1980s, Yonhap reported, citing South Korean government officials it didn't further identify.
Kim Ok, 42, "virtually acts as North Korea's first lady" and frequently accompanies the North Korean leader on his visits to military bases and in meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries, Yonhap said.
She also traveled with Kim Jong Il on a secretive trip to China in January, when she was received by Chinese officials as Kim's wife, the report said. Kim Ok also met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, it said.
It is not known whether Kim Ok and the North Korean leader have any children, Yonhap said.
Kim Jong Il is known to have three sons -- one from his second wife and two from his third. North Korean experts say Kim's 25-year-old son Kim Jong Chul is most likely to become the North's next leader.
His eldest son, Kim Jong Nam, is said to have fallen out of favor after embarrassing his father in 2001 when he was caught trying to enter Japan on a fake passport, saying he wanted to visit Tokyo Disneyland.
Saturday, July 22, 2006
SOMALIA
Geography
Somalia, situated in the Horn of Africa, lies along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It is bounded by Djibouti in the northwest, Ethiopia in the west, and Kenya in the southwest. In area it is slightly smaller than Texas. Generally arid and barren, Somalia has two chief rivers, the Shebelle and the Juba.
Government
Between Jan. 1991 and Aug. 2000, Somalia had no working government. A fragile parliamentary government was formed in 2000, but it expired in 2003 without establishing control of the country. In 2004, a new transitional Parliament was instituted and elected a president.
History
From the 7th to the 10th century, Arab and Persian trading posts were established along the coast of present-day Somalia. Nomadic tribes occupied the interior, occasionally pushing into Ethiopian territory. In the 16th century, Turkish rule extended to the northern coast, and the Sultans of Zanzibar gained control in the south.
After British occupation of Aden in 1839, the Somali coast became its source of food. The French established a coal-mining station in 1862 at the site of Djibouti, and the Italians planted a settlement in Eritrea. Egypt, which for a time claimed Turkish rights in the area, was succeeded by Britain. By 1920, a British and an Italian protectorate occupied what is now Somalia. The British ruled the entire area after 1941, with Italy returning in 1950 to serve as United Nations trustee for its former territory.
By 1960, Britain and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors, enabling the two to join as the Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960. Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963 when the British granted the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the Republic of Kenya.
On Oct. 15, 1969, President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated and the army seized power. Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, as president of a renamed Somali Democratic Republic, leaned heavily toward the USSR. In 1977, Somalia openly backed rebels in the easternmost area of Ethiopia, the Ogaden Desert, which had been seized by Ethiopia at the turn of the century. Somalia acknowledged defeat in an eight-month war against the Ethiopians that year, having lost much of its 32,000-man army and most of its tanks and planes. President Siad Barre fled the country in late Jan. 1991. His departure left Somalia in the hands of a number of clan-based guerrilla groups, none of which trusted each other.
Africa's worst drought of the century occurred in 1992, and, coupled with the devastation of civil war, Somalia was plunged into a severe famine that killed 300,000. U.S. troops were sent in to protect the delivery of food in Dec. 1992, and in May 1993 the UN took control of the relief efforts from the U.S. The warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid ambushed UN troops and dragged American bodies through the streets, causing an about-face in U.S. willingness to involve itself in the fate of this lawless country. The last of the U.S. troops departed in late March, leaving 19,000 UN troops behind.
Since 1991 Somalia has been engulfed in anarchy. Years of peace negotiations between the various factions were fruitless, and warlords and militias ruled over individual swaths of land. In 1991, a breakaway nation, the Somaliland Republic, proclaimed its independence. Since then several warlords have set up their own ministates in Puntland and Jubaland. Although internationally unrecognized, these states have been peaceful and stable.
In Aug. 2000, a Parliament convened in nearby Djibouti and elected Somalia's first government in nearly a decade. After its first year in office, the government still controlled only 10% of the country, and in Aug. 2003, its mandate expired. In Oct. 2002, new talks to establish a government began; in Aug. 2004 a 275-member transitional Parliament was inaugurated for a five-year term. Parliament selected a national president in September, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the president of the breakaway region of Puntland. The new government, however, spent its first year operating out of Kenya—Somalia remained too violent and unstable to enter—eventually settling in the provincial town of Baidoa.
In May 2006, the country's worst outbreak of violence in 10 years occurred, with Islamist militias battling rival warlords. On June 6, an Islamist militia seized control of the capital, Mogadishu, and established control in much of the south. This was a setback for the Bush administration's controversial policy in the country—as part of its war on terror, the U.S. is widely thought to have covertly backed various warlords against the Islamists, despite the warlords' perpetuation of violence and mayhem throughout the country. The U.S. is concerned that the lawless and chaotic nation will become an al-Qaeda breeding ground, but its support of the now-defeated warlords has deepened the U.S. unpopularity in the country. Although one leader of the Islamists, Sharif Ahmed, has indicated his desire for good relations with the West, another emerging leader, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, is considered a hardliner who wants to turn Somalia into an Islamist state ruled by sharia law. The sheik is barred from entering the U.S. because of his ties to terrorist groups. Somalia's transitional government, led by President Abdullahi Yusuf and situated in Baidoa, remains intact, and has the support of neighboring Ethiopia, which has clashed in the past with Somalia's Islamists. The international community has urged negotiations between the Islamists and the transitional government.
Somalia - Somalia , country (2005 est. pop. 8,591,000), 246,200 sq mi (637,657 sq km), extreme E Africa. It ...
Somalia - Somalia Profile: Geography, People, History, Government, Political Conditions, Economy, Foreign Relations, U.S.-Somali Relations
Atlas: Somalia - Facts on Somalia: flags, maps, geography, history, statistics, disasters current events, and international relations.
Somalia: Bibliography - Bibliography See R. L. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia (1966); D. D. Laitin and S. S. Samatar, ...
Somalia: History - History Early and Colonial Periods Between the 7th and 10th cent., immigrant Muslim Arabs and ...
Somalia, situated in the Horn of Africa, lies along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It is bounded by Djibouti in the northwest, Ethiopia in the west, and Kenya in the southwest. In area it is slightly smaller than Texas. Generally arid and barren, Somalia has two chief rivers, the Shebelle and the Juba.
Government
Between Jan. 1991 and Aug. 2000, Somalia had no working government. A fragile parliamentary government was formed in 2000, but it expired in 2003 without establishing control of the country. In 2004, a new transitional Parliament was instituted and elected a president.
History
From the 7th to the 10th century, Arab and Persian trading posts were established along the coast of present-day Somalia. Nomadic tribes occupied the interior, occasionally pushing into Ethiopian territory. In the 16th century, Turkish rule extended to the northern coast, and the Sultans of Zanzibar gained control in the south.
After British occupation of Aden in 1839, the Somali coast became its source of food. The French established a coal-mining station in 1862 at the site of Djibouti, and the Italians planted a settlement in Eritrea. Egypt, which for a time claimed Turkish rights in the area, was succeeded by Britain. By 1920, a British and an Italian protectorate occupied what is now Somalia. The British ruled the entire area after 1941, with Italy returning in 1950 to serve as United Nations trustee for its former territory.
By 1960, Britain and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors, enabling the two to join as the Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960. Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963 when the British granted the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the Republic of Kenya.
On Oct. 15, 1969, President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated and the army seized power. Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, as president of a renamed Somali Democratic Republic, leaned heavily toward the USSR. In 1977, Somalia openly backed rebels in the easternmost area of Ethiopia, the Ogaden Desert, which had been seized by Ethiopia at the turn of the century. Somalia acknowledged defeat in an eight-month war against the Ethiopians that year, having lost much of its 32,000-man army and most of its tanks and planes. President Siad Barre fled the country in late Jan. 1991. His departure left Somalia in the hands of a number of clan-based guerrilla groups, none of which trusted each other.
Africa's worst drought of the century occurred in 1992, and, coupled with the devastation of civil war, Somalia was plunged into a severe famine that killed 300,000. U.S. troops were sent in to protect the delivery of food in Dec. 1992, and in May 1993 the UN took control of the relief efforts from the U.S. The warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid ambushed UN troops and dragged American bodies through the streets, causing an about-face in U.S. willingness to involve itself in the fate of this lawless country. The last of the U.S. troops departed in late March, leaving 19,000 UN troops behind.
Since 1991 Somalia has been engulfed in anarchy. Years of peace negotiations between the various factions were fruitless, and warlords and militias ruled over individual swaths of land. In 1991, a breakaway nation, the Somaliland Republic, proclaimed its independence. Since then several warlords have set up their own ministates in Puntland and Jubaland. Although internationally unrecognized, these states have been peaceful and stable.
In Aug. 2000, a Parliament convened in nearby Djibouti and elected Somalia's first government in nearly a decade. After its first year in office, the government still controlled only 10% of the country, and in Aug. 2003, its mandate expired. In Oct. 2002, new talks to establish a government began; in Aug. 2004 a 275-member transitional Parliament was inaugurated for a five-year term. Parliament selected a national president in September, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the president of the breakaway region of Puntland. The new government, however, spent its first year operating out of Kenya—Somalia remained too violent and unstable to enter—eventually settling in the provincial town of Baidoa.
In May 2006, the country's worst outbreak of violence in 10 years occurred, with Islamist militias battling rival warlords. On June 6, an Islamist militia seized control of the capital, Mogadishu, and established control in much of the south. This was a setback for the Bush administration's controversial policy in the country—as part of its war on terror, the U.S. is widely thought to have covertly backed various warlords against the Islamists, despite the warlords' perpetuation of violence and mayhem throughout the country. The U.S. is concerned that the lawless and chaotic nation will become an al-Qaeda breeding ground, but its support of the now-defeated warlords has deepened the U.S. unpopularity in the country. Although one leader of the Islamists, Sharif Ahmed, has indicated his desire for good relations with the West, another emerging leader, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, is considered a hardliner who wants to turn Somalia into an Islamist state ruled by sharia law. The sheik is barred from entering the U.S. because of his ties to terrorist groups. Somalia's transitional government, led by President Abdullahi Yusuf and situated in Baidoa, remains intact, and has the support of neighboring Ethiopia, which has clashed in the past with Somalia's Islamists. The international community has urged negotiations between the Islamists and the transitional government.
Somalia - Somalia , country (2005 est. pop. 8,591,000), 246,200 sq mi (637,657 sq km), extreme E Africa. It ...
Somalia - Somalia Profile: Geography, People, History, Government, Political Conditions, Economy, Foreign Relations, U.S.-Somali Relations
Atlas: Somalia - Facts on Somalia: flags, maps, geography, history, statistics, disasters current events, and international relations.
Somalia: Bibliography - Bibliography See R. L. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia (1966); D. D. Laitin and S. S. Samatar, ...
Somalia: History - History Early and Colonial Periods Between the 7th and 10th cent., immigrant Muslim Arabs and ...
If necessary, strike and destroy North Korean missile Dammie
Former defense secretary William J. Perry and assistant secretary Ashton B. Carter advise that if North Korea persists in its test launch preparations of an intercontinental ballistic missile, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the missile before it can be launched. The op-ed sparked debate in Washington and in the media.
Originally appeared in Wasington Post, June 22, 2006
Originally appeared in Wasington Post, June 22, 2006
West divided over Israel-Lebanon crisis and More
As the Israeli air campaign against Lebanon entered its eighth day on Thursday, the US and the EU continued to grapple for an adequate response with increased concern about civilian suffering in the region.
On Wednesday, Israeli air strikes killed more than 50 people across Lebanon. Israeli military officials also said they had bombed a bunker sheltering Hizbollah leaders, though Hizbollah said none of its members were killed in the operation.
On Thursday, Israel urged Lebanese residents in the country's south to evacuate before more strikes. Also on Thursday, Israeli forces battled Hizbollah forces on the Lebanese side of the border, suffering an unknown number of casualties, news agencies reported. Israeli forces crossed in an attempt to push back Hizbollah, which has been firing rockets into northern Israel. Hizbollah fired more than 100 rockets into northern Israel on Wednesday alone, hitting Haifa and Nazareth and killing two Israeli-Arab boys, news agencies reported.
The fighting between Israel and Lebanon erupted nine days ago after a Hizbollah raid in which eight Israeli soldiers were killed and two others abducted. After the clash Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned that the battle had only just begun.
In an interview with Paris-based France Inter radio on Thursday, Lebanon’s President Emile Lahoud demanded an immediate ceasefire and called Israel’s offensive a “massacre.”
In a further development, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour said Israeli and Hizbollah leaders could face war crimes charges if it is proven that they have deliberately targeted civilians.
A Wednesday editorial on the online version of The Economist expressed concern that Israel, if it failed to achieve its aim in the current air campaign, might once again have to “commit serious numbers of ground forces [and] risks getting bogged down in southern Lebanon.”
Has Israel “fallen for a Hizbollah trap?” the editorial asks. Unclear about Hizbollah’s exact intentions in the present conflict, the editorial speculates that Hizbollah kidnapped the Israeli soldiers to provoke a forceful Israeli response to “drag Israel into a war on two fronts, perhaps with the backing of Syria and Iran [which would both] benefit from chaos and instability in the region.” This line of thinking has also been seen in the Israeli media, with some speculating that the Hizbollah border raid was also meant to steal the limelight from Hamas' recent success in attacking an Israeli outpost near the Gaza Strip.
A divided EU
According to the Associated Press, EU member states fear that continued Israeli bombardment would strengthen the hand of Islamists and terrorist groups using the imagery of civilian casualties in Lebanon as a propaganda tool.
In the meantime, the EU has called Israel’s action a “disproportionate” use of force and has demanded an immediate ceasefire. EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana repeated this call during a visit to Israel on Wednesday.
French President Jacques Chirac urged both Hizbollah and Israel to stop the hostilities. France, which currently holds the presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and has historic ties with Lebanon, has issued a proposal for a binding UNSC resolution to bring the fighting to a halt.
Equally worried about further escalation of the conflict is Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who indirectly criticized Israel’s action by lamenting “the destruction of the civilian infrastructure of Lebanon.” On Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin held out the possibility of contributing Russian troops if the UNSC was to establish a security force in southern Lebanon.
The British newspaper The Guardian heavily criticized the weak and divided EU position in a Tuesday editorial: “Europe’s position […] matters because it aspires to play a role on the world stage, because the Middle East is its own backyard and because the area’s quarrels can explode on our streets and trains.”
“European citizens, want to know that the EU is not just watching helplessly and letting the US dictate vital decisions as fateful, bloody and epoch-making events unfold,” the editorial continued.
Both Europe and the US have so far failed to agree on a decisive policy to bring the fighting to a halt.
The question of a UN defense force
British Prime Minister Tony Blair and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan Tuesday called for the deployment of a multinational force to Lebanon - an idea that the US and Israel have so far opposed.
US skepticism is grounded in the fact that the 2000-strong UN peacekeeping force that is already stationed in southern Lebanon has failed to prevent the positioning of thousands of rockets by Hizbollah militants. Similarly, UNSC Resolution 1559, which calls for the complete disarming of Hizbollah, has failed to achieve its objective.
Moreover, the US, which has consistently affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself against Hizbollah attacks, wants to give Israel more time to expel Hizbollah from the region. “A cease-fire [a prerequisite for the deployment of UN forces] that would leave intact a terrorist infrastructure is unacceptable,” White House spokesman Tony Snow said.
Former intelligence analyst with the US State Department and Defense Department Anthony Cordesman explained during an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that the effective deployment of a UN peacekeeping force would require the active support of the Lebanese government and military, as well as the cooperation of the Shi'ite population in southern Lebanon.
Similarly pessimistic about the rapid deployment of a UN force in Lebanon is former German oreign minister and Middle East expert Joschka Fischer, who told the German newspaper Die Zeit that “another Blue Helmet mandate will make little sense. Only a robust mandate could perhaps achieve something positive.” Fischer stressed the importance of Washington's role in solving the conflict. He called the failure of the “Middle East Quartet” (US, EU, UN and Russia) to effectively address the conflict “a tragedy.”
Meanwhile, Italy has backed the British proposal for a UN peacekeeping force, but some have questioned its motivation. In a commentary published in the Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore, Stefano Folli speculated that newly elected Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi has domestic political objectives in mind. By supporting a UN intervention, Prodi seeks to win over the mainly anti-Israel radical left within his ruling coalition, Folli opined. “These groups see the United Nations as retribution meted out to Israel, which is paradoxical indeed, because intervention by the Blue Helmets was something else in Blair’s scheme of things: an international shouldering of responsibility for disarming the Hizbollah.”
By catering to his far-left allies, Folli speculates, Prodi seeks to gain the left’s support for a funding renewal for Italy's military mission in Afghanistan, which the radical left has so far opposed. The Italian parliament will vote on the funding request on 25 July. “Israel would be the great collective excuse for fostering a compromise on the left over the mission in Kabul. A strange, but not surprising arabesque,” the editorial concluded.
Lamenting US weakness
William Kristol, writing in the neo-conservative US magazine Weekly Standard, does not see the crisis in Lebanon as a local war requiring a local solution. Rather, he depicts the conflict as part of a global struggle between Islam and “liberal democratic civilization.”
“What’s happening in the Middle East, then, isn’t just another chapter in the Arab-Israeli conflict. What’s happening is an Islamist-Israeli war. You might even say this is part of the Islamist war on the West.”
Kristol called upon the US government to focus less on Hamas and Hizbollah and more “on their paymasters and real commanders - Syria and Iran." The United States needs to forcefully reassert its power in the region and “pursue […] regime change in Syria and Iran,” even considering “a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.”
The US has stood aside for too long, making itself appear weak in the eyes of its Islamist enemies, Kristol said.
On the liberal spectrum of the US foreign policy debate, weakness is lamented in diplomatic rather than military terms. John Judis noted in the New Republic Online that Arab-Israeli crises always tended to inflame when “the United States has been either unable or unwilling to play an aggressive role as a mediator,” and added that “most [conflicts] have only abated after the United States has finally thrown itself into the middle of them.” Before the Six Day War, for example, the US was too bogged down in Vietnam to help prevent Egypt’s provocation from escalating.
At the same time, Judis noted, “the greatest progress in Arab-Israeli relations occurred during the Carter and Clinton administrations when American policymakers were most clearly concentrating on the conflict.”
Judis blamed the current Bush administration for its hands-off approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. “[Bush’s] principal means of seeking peace in the region were based on a neoconservative fantasy about the road to Jerusalem passing through Baghdad […] and on the assumption that Palestinian elections would result in a moderate alternative to the late Yasir Arafat," Judis argued. When these strategies proved to be unsuccessful and Hamas won the Palestinian elections, the US stood by helplessly, which, according to Judis, precipitated the current crisis.
But some disagree as to how much leverage the US has over the conflict.
Oxford scholar Timothy Garton Ash does not believe Washington could effect much change. “Welcome to the world’s new multipolar disorder,” he wrote in the commentary pages of The Guardian. “The unipolar moment of apparently unchallengeable American supremacy” is over Ash predicted, noting that the emerging new multipolarity is defined by the rise of other states - such as China, India and Russia - and the growing power of non-state actors, including terrorist groups. These groups are aided by technological developments that allow them to inflict considerable harm to powerful states despite their being a small and weak minority.
“The net effect of these very disparate trends is to reduce the relative power of established western states, above all of the US," Ash wrote, noting that changes in the geopolitical power structure have historically brought about new waves of violence. “Be careful what you wish for,” Ash warned. “You might even find yourself nostalgic for the bad old days of American supremacy.”
On Wednesday, Israeli air strikes killed more than 50 people across Lebanon. Israeli military officials also said they had bombed a bunker sheltering Hizbollah leaders, though Hizbollah said none of its members were killed in the operation.
On Thursday, Israel urged Lebanese residents in the country's south to evacuate before more strikes. Also on Thursday, Israeli forces battled Hizbollah forces on the Lebanese side of the border, suffering an unknown number of casualties, news agencies reported. Israeli forces crossed in an attempt to push back Hizbollah, which has been firing rockets into northern Israel. Hizbollah fired more than 100 rockets into northern Israel on Wednesday alone, hitting Haifa and Nazareth and killing two Israeli-Arab boys, news agencies reported.
The fighting between Israel and Lebanon erupted nine days ago after a Hizbollah raid in which eight Israeli soldiers were killed and two others abducted. After the clash Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned that the battle had only just begun.
In an interview with Paris-based France Inter radio on Thursday, Lebanon’s President Emile Lahoud demanded an immediate ceasefire and called Israel’s offensive a “massacre.”
In a further development, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour said Israeli and Hizbollah leaders could face war crimes charges if it is proven that they have deliberately targeted civilians.
A Wednesday editorial on the online version of The Economist expressed concern that Israel, if it failed to achieve its aim in the current air campaign, might once again have to “commit serious numbers of ground forces [and] risks getting bogged down in southern Lebanon.”
Has Israel “fallen for a Hizbollah trap?” the editorial asks. Unclear about Hizbollah’s exact intentions in the present conflict, the editorial speculates that Hizbollah kidnapped the Israeli soldiers to provoke a forceful Israeli response to “drag Israel into a war on two fronts, perhaps with the backing of Syria and Iran [which would both] benefit from chaos and instability in the region.” This line of thinking has also been seen in the Israeli media, with some speculating that the Hizbollah border raid was also meant to steal the limelight from Hamas' recent success in attacking an Israeli outpost near the Gaza Strip.
A divided EU
According to the Associated Press, EU member states fear that continued Israeli bombardment would strengthen the hand of Islamists and terrorist groups using the imagery of civilian casualties in Lebanon as a propaganda tool.
In the meantime, the EU has called Israel’s action a “disproportionate” use of force and has demanded an immediate ceasefire. EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana repeated this call during a visit to Israel on Wednesday.
French President Jacques Chirac urged both Hizbollah and Israel to stop the hostilities. France, which currently holds the presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and has historic ties with Lebanon, has issued a proposal for a binding UNSC resolution to bring the fighting to a halt.
Equally worried about further escalation of the conflict is Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who indirectly criticized Israel’s action by lamenting “the destruction of the civilian infrastructure of Lebanon.” On Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin held out the possibility of contributing Russian troops if the UNSC was to establish a security force in southern Lebanon.
The British newspaper The Guardian heavily criticized the weak and divided EU position in a Tuesday editorial: “Europe’s position […] matters because it aspires to play a role on the world stage, because the Middle East is its own backyard and because the area’s quarrels can explode on our streets and trains.”
“European citizens, want to know that the EU is not just watching helplessly and letting the US dictate vital decisions as fateful, bloody and epoch-making events unfold,” the editorial continued.
Both Europe and the US have so far failed to agree on a decisive policy to bring the fighting to a halt.
The question of a UN defense force
British Prime Minister Tony Blair and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan Tuesday called for the deployment of a multinational force to Lebanon - an idea that the US and Israel have so far opposed.
US skepticism is grounded in the fact that the 2000-strong UN peacekeeping force that is already stationed in southern Lebanon has failed to prevent the positioning of thousands of rockets by Hizbollah militants. Similarly, UNSC Resolution 1559, which calls for the complete disarming of Hizbollah, has failed to achieve its objective.
Moreover, the US, which has consistently affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself against Hizbollah attacks, wants to give Israel more time to expel Hizbollah from the region. “A cease-fire [a prerequisite for the deployment of UN forces] that would leave intact a terrorist infrastructure is unacceptable,” White House spokesman Tony Snow said.
Former intelligence analyst with the US State Department and Defense Department Anthony Cordesman explained during an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that the effective deployment of a UN peacekeeping force would require the active support of the Lebanese government and military, as well as the cooperation of the Shi'ite population in southern Lebanon.
Similarly pessimistic about the rapid deployment of a UN force in Lebanon is former German oreign minister and Middle East expert Joschka Fischer, who told the German newspaper Die Zeit that “another Blue Helmet mandate will make little sense. Only a robust mandate could perhaps achieve something positive.” Fischer stressed the importance of Washington's role in solving the conflict. He called the failure of the “Middle East Quartet” (US, EU, UN and Russia) to effectively address the conflict “a tragedy.”
Meanwhile, Italy has backed the British proposal for a UN peacekeeping force, but some have questioned its motivation. In a commentary published in the Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore, Stefano Folli speculated that newly elected Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi has domestic political objectives in mind. By supporting a UN intervention, Prodi seeks to win over the mainly anti-Israel radical left within his ruling coalition, Folli opined. “These groups see the United Nations as retribution meted out to Israel, which is paradoxical indeed, because intervention by the Blue Helmets was something else in Blair’s scheme of things: an international shouldering of responsibility for disarming the Hizbollah.”
By catering to his far-left allies, Folli speculates, Prodi seeks to gain the left’s support for a funding renewal for Italy's military mission in Afghanistan, which the radical left has so far opposed. The Italian parliament will vote on the funding request on 25 July. “Israel would be the great collective excuse for fostering a compromise on the left over the mission in Kabul. A strange, but not surprising arabesque,” the editorial concluded.
Lamenting US weakness
William Kristol, writing in the neo-conservative US magazine Weekly Standard, does not see the crisis in Lebanon as a local war requiring a local solution. Rather, he depicts the conflict as part of a global struggle between Islam and “liberal democratic civilization.”
“What’s happening in the Middle East, then, isn’t just another chapter in the Arab-Israeli conflict. What’s happening is an Islamist-Israeli war. You might even say this is part of the Islamist war on the West.”
Kristol called upon the US government to focus less on Hamas and Hizbollah and more “on their paymasters and real commanders - Syria and Iran." The United States needs to forcefully reassert its power in the region and “pursue […] regime change in Syria and Iran,” even considering “a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.”
The US has stood aside for too long, making itself appear weak in the eyes of its Islamist enemies, Kristol said.
On the liberal spectrum of the US foreign policy debate, weakness is lamented in diplomatic rather than military terms. John Judis noted in the New Republic Online that Arab-Israeli crises always tended to inflame when “the United States has been either unable or unwilling to play an aggressive role as a mediator,” and added that “most [conflicts] have only abated after the United States has finally thrown itself into the middle of them.” Before the Six Day War, for example, the US was too bogged down in Vietnam to help prevent Egypt’s provocation from escalating.
At the same time, Judis noted, “the greatest progress in Arab-Israeli relations occurred during the Carter and Clinton administrations when American policymakers were most clearly concentrating on the conflict.”
Judis blamed the current Bush administration for its hands-off approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. “[Bush’s] principal means of seeking peace in the region were based on a neoconservative fantasy about the road to Jerusalem passing through Baghdad […] and on the assumption that Palestinian elections would result in a moderate alternative to the late Yasir Arafat," Judis argued. When these strategies proved to be unsuccessful and Hamas won the Palestinian elections, the US stood by helplessly, which, according to Judis, precipitated the current crisis.
But some disagree as to how much leverage the US has over the conflict.
Oxford scholar Timothy Garton Ash does not believe Washington could effect much change. “Welcome to the world’s new multipolar disorder,” he wrote in the commentary pages of The Guardian. “The unipolar moment of apparently unchallengeable American supremacy” is over Ash predicted, noting that the emerging new multipolarity is defined by the rise of other states - such as China, India and Russia - and the growing power of non-state actors, including terrorist groups. These groups are aided by technological developments that allow them to inflict considerable harm to powerful states despite their being a small and weak minority.
“The net effect of these very disparate trends is to reduce the relative power of established western states, above all of the US," Ash wrote, noting that changes in the geopolitical power structure have historically brought about new waves of violence. “Be careful what you wish for,” Ash warned. “You might even find yourself nostalgic for the bad old days of American supremacy.”
International Security
International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on all aspects of the control and use of force. Its articles cover contemporary policy issues, and probe historical and theoretical questions behind them. Essays in International Security have defined the debate on American national security policy and have set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs
Israeli troops take control of border village
From the Israeli side of the border, Israeli troops were seen heading into Maroun al-Ras and were fighting with some Hezbollah militants. At one point, a half-ton bomb hit a Hezbollah outpost near Maroun al-Ras.
Thursday, July 20, 2006
How Kim Jong-il Obtained U.S. Visa in 1997
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and two other North Koreans obtained U.S. entry visas using fake Eastern European passports in 1997, the February edition of the Monthly Chosun reports.
The magazine, published Tuesday, said that several months after the visas were issued, U.S. intelligence officials realized that the photos on the ledger were those of Kim Jong-il, a secretary by the name Park, and Kim’s mistress Chung Il-son. Investigations revealed that Park and Chung went in and out of the U.S. several times. It was not clear why Kim wanted a visa.
The monthly also reported that Ko Yong-suk, the sister of Kim Jong-il's recently deceased wife Ko Young-hee, defected to the United States in May 1998 with her husband, a man in his late 40s identified only as Park, through the U.S. Embassy in Switzerland. Ko tipped off U.S. officials that Kim was investing in the New York stock market. Kim's investments were subsequently frozen.
SYRIA NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE AND CONCERNS
Under Assad, Syria has sought to be a leading Arab and regional power, capable of controlling or influencing Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Syria seeks to participate in every issue in the region and to further policies that substantiate its claim to an effective regional role. In pursuing these objectives, Syria is striving for regional hegemony--a goal that ultimately is likely to be beyond Syria's capabilities and resources. In fact, according to various analysts, Syria's pursuit of this goal will undermine its precarious stability.
Syria also has striven to lead the Arab resistance to Israel and to oppose, both militarily and politically, the path leading to diplomatic recognition of Israel's legitimacy, to which Egypt agreed through the Camp David Accords (see Foreign Policy , ch. 4). In pursuit of its goals, the Syrian regime formulated the doctrine of "strategic parity" with Israel, which involved upgrading the country's military capability and materiel to give it an edge in a future confrontation.
Regionally, Syria was intent on achieving a number of military and political objectives. These included the reconquest of the Golan Heights (in early 1987 it had deployed a force of about six divisions in the Damascus-Golan Heights region), and opposition to the establishment of an Israeli-dominated "security zone" (manned largely by the Christian forces of the pro-Israel South Lebanon Army) in southern Lebanon. Syria also sought to control Lebanese affairs and to restrict the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) military forces in Lebanon, without formally annexing territory or having to maintain a large military presence there.
As part of its national security doctrine, Syria has sought to expand ts relationship with the Soviet Union, as embodied in the 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Specifically, Syria endeavored to formalize the relationship with a "strategic cooperation" agreement comparable to the treaty between the United States and Israel.
Syria also employed terrorism in pursuit of its security objectives. In the mid-1980s, Syria was accused--primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom--of playing an active role in international terrorist activities through sponsorship of Palestinian, Lebanese, and other Arab terrorist groups. Furthermore, Syria had been directly implicated in a series of terrorist attacks on American, West European, Israeli, Jewish, Palestinian, Jordanian, and Turkish targets outside the Middle East.
Syria also has striven to lead the Arab resistance to Israel and to oppose, both militarily and politically, the path leading to diplomatic recognition of Israel's legitimacy, to which Egypt agreed through the Camp David Accords (see Foreign Policy , ch. 4). In pursuit of its goals, the Syrian regime formulated the doctrine of "strategic parity" with Israel, which involved upgrading the country's military capability and materiel to give it an edge in a future confrontation.
Regionally, Syria was intent on achieving a number of military and political objectives. These included the reconquest of the Golan Heights (in early 1987 it had deployed a force of about six divisions in the Damascus-Golan Heights region), and opposition to the establishment of an Israeli-dominated "security zone" (manned largely by the Christian forces of the pro-Israel South Lebanon Army) in southern Lebanon. Syria also sought to control Lebanese affairs and to restrict the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) military forces in Lebanon, without formally annexing territory or having to maintain a large military presence there.
As part of its national security doctrine, Syria has sought to expand ts relationship with the Soviet Union, as embodied in the 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Specifically, Syria endeavored to formalize the relationship with a "strategic cooperation" agreement comparable to the treaty between the United States and Israel.
Syria also employed terrorism in pursuit of its security objectives. In the mid-1980s, Syria was accused--primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom--of playing an active role in international terrorist activities through sponsorship of Palestinian, Lebanese, and other Arab terrorist groups. Furthermore, Syria had been directly implicated in a series of terrorist attacks on American, West European, Israeli, Jewish, Palestinian, Jordanian, and Turkish targets outside the Middle East.
IRAN: Country Profile
GEOGRAPHY
Size: Land area of about 1,648,000 square kilometers; sovereignty claimed over territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles.
Topography: Large Central Plateau surrounded on three sides by rugged mountain ranges. Highest peak Mount Damavand, approximately 5,600 meters; Caspian Sea about 27 meters below sea level.
SOCIETY
Population: Preliminary results of October 1986 census listed total population as 48,181,463, including approximately 2.6 million refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq. Population grew at rate of 3.6 percent per annum between 1976 and 1986. Government figures showed 50 percent of population under fifteen years of age in 1986.
Education: School system consists of five years of primary (begun at seven years of age), three years of middle school, and four years of high school education. High school has three cycles: academic, science and mathematics, and vocational technical. Government announced 11.5 million students in above school system in academic year 1986-87; percentage of school age population in school not published. Postrevolution decrease in university enrollments, particularly percentage of women students, which declined from 40 percent in prerevolutionary period to 10 percent in 1984. Number of students abroad also declined.
Health: Iranian Medical Association reported 12,300 doctors in 1986; 38,000 additional doctors needed to provide population with minimally adequate health care. Most medical personnel located in large cities. High infant mortality rate. Gastrointestinal, parasitic, and respiratory diseases other chief causes of mortality.
Languages: Persian official language and native tongue of over half the population. Spoken as a second language by majority of the remainder. Other Indo-European languages, such as Kirmanji (the collective term in Iran for the dialects spoken by Kurds), as well as Turkic languages and Arabic also important.
Religion: Shia Islam official religion with at least 90 percent adherence. Also approximately 8 percent Sunni Muslims and smaller numbers of Bahais, Armenian and Assyrian Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians.
NORTH KOREA NUKE OPTION: Library of Congress
In the early 1990s, there was growing international concern that North Korea was seeking to produce nuclear weapons. In 1991, despite North Korea's repeated denials of a nuclear weapons program, United States policy experts generally agreed that P'yongyang was engaged in a nuclear weapons program. The debate has centered on when, rather than whether, North Korea will have a nuclear capability. Estimates range from 1993 to several years later.
North Korean nuclear-related activities began in 1955, when representatives of the Academy of Sciences participated in an East European conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 1956 North Korea signed two agreements with the Soviet Union covering joint nuclear research. In 1959 additional agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were signed with the Soviet Union and China. The 1959 Soviet agreement apparently included setting up a nuclear research facility under the Academy of Sciences near Yngbyn and developing a nuclear-related curriculum at Kim Il Sung University. Chinese and Soviet assistance with training of nuclear scientists and technicians, although not continuous, is the major source of North Korean nuclear expertise. In the 1980s, P'yongyang had a rather eclectic if low-key web of nuclear connections that included Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and the former Democratic Republic of Germany (East Germany). North Korea also is believed to have nuclearrelated connections with Egypt, Iran, Libya, Romania, and Syria.
The Yngbyn center was established in early 1962 at Yong Dong on the Kuryong River, approximately 100 kilometers north of Pyngyang and southwest of the city of Yngbyn. Construction began in 1965 on a Soviet-supplied two-kilowatt nuclear research reactor (IRT2000) that is believed to have become operational in 1967. The reactor was brought under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA--see Glossary) controls in July 1977 and was modified over time to increase its power to approximately eight kilowatts.
During the mid-1970s, North Korea began expanding its nuclear infrastructure. In 1980 construction began on an indigenously designed, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled thirty-megawatt reactor, which probably is primarily for plutonium production. The use of graphite and natural uranium allowed North Korea to avoid foreign involvement and constraints. The reactor apparently became operational in 1987, but its existence has not been formally acknowledged by North Korea.
According to many sources, United States satellites detected additional nuclear-related facilities under construction in the Yngbyn area during 1989. When completed, the facilities will give North Korea the complete nuclear fuel cycle needed for weapons production. These facilities consist of a high explosives testing site, a reprocessing facility, a third reactor in the fifty-megawatt to 200-megawatt range, and associated support facilities. According to sources, construction began on a third reactor in 1984-85 and on a reprocessing facility in 1988-89; the former is scheduled to be operational by the end of 1992 but was not on-line as of mid-1993, and the latter perhaps a little later. Neither the thirty-megawatt reactor nor the third reactor are said to be connected to a power grid for power generation. In 1990 these reports were substantiated by satellite photography read by Japanese scientists. According to South Korean sources, if all the facilities come online, North Korea will be capable of producing enough plutonium for two to four twenty-kiloton nuclear weapons a year. The facilities, however, are contaminated and not operational.
P'yongyang signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in July 1985 but delayed signing the IAEA Full Scope Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA granted an eighteen-month extension of the usual eighteen months necessary to administer and sign such agreements. North Korea agreed in principle to the agreement in July 1991, but delayed signing until January 30, 1992; implementation was not to take place until after ratification of the agreement. In a series of agreements with South Korea at the end of 1991, North Korea agreed to set up a Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) to ensure that there are no nuclear weapons in either country. The committee will develop procedures for additional inspections to encompass facilities normally outside IAEA jurisdiction, such as military facilities.
North Korean nuclear-related activities began in 1955, when representatives of the Academy of Sciences participated in an East European conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 1956 North Korea signed two agreements with the Soviet Union covering joint nuclear research. In 1959 additional agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were signed with the Soviet Union and China. The 1959 Soviet agreement apparently included setting up a nuclear research facility under the Academy of Sciences near Yngbyn and developing a nuclear-related curriculum at Kim Il Sung University. Chinese and Soviet assistance with training of nuclear scientists and technicians, although not continuous, is the major source of North Korean nuclear expertise. In the 1980s, P'yongyang had a rather eclectic if low-key web of nuclear connections that included Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and the former Democratic Republic of Germany (East Germany). North Korea also is believed to have nuclearrelated connections with Egypt, Iran, Libya, Romania, and Syria.
The Yngbyn center was established in early 1962 at Yong Dong on the Kuryong River, approximately 100 kilometers north of Pyngyang and southwest of the city of Yngbyn. Construction began in 1965 on a Soviet-supplied two-kilowatt nuclear research reactor (IRT2000) that is believed to have become operational in 1967. The reactor was brought under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA--see Glossary) controls in July 1977 and was modified over time to increase its power to approximately eight kilowatts.
During the mid-1970s, North Korea began expanding its nuclear infrastructure. In 1980 construction began on an indigenously designed, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled thirty-megawatt reactor, which probably is primarily for plutonium production. The use of graphite and natural uranium allowed North Korea to avoid foreign involvement and constraints. The reactor apparently became operational in 1987, but its existence has not been formally acknowledged by North Korea.
According to many sources, United States satellites detected additional nuclear-related facilities under construction in the Yngbyn area during 1989. When completed, the facilities will give North Korea the complete nuclear fuel cycle needed for weapons production. These facilities consist of a high explosives testing site, a reprocessing facility, a third reactor in the fifty-megawatt to 200-megawatt range, and associated support facilities. According to sources, construction began on a third reactor in 1984-85 and on a reprocessing facility in 1988-89; the former is scheduled to be operational by the end of 1992 but was not on-line as of mid-1993, and the latter perhaps a little later. Neither the thirty-megawatt reactor nor the third reactor are said to be connected to a power grid for power generation. In 1990 these reports were substantiated by satellite photography read by Japanese scientists. According to South Korean sources, if all the facilities come online, North Korea will be capable of producing enough plutonium for two to four twenty-kiloton nuclear weapons a year. The facilities, however, are contaminated and not operational.
P'yongyang signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in July 1985 but delayed signing the IAEA Full Scope Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA granted an eighteen-month extension of the usual eighteen months necessary to administer and sign such agreements. North Korea agreed in principle to the agreement in July 1991, but delayed signing until January 30, 1992; implementation was not to take place until after ratification of the agreement. In a series of agreements with South Korea at the end of 1991, North Korea agreed to set up a Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) to ensure that there are no nuclear weapons in either country. The committee will develop procedures for additional inspections to encompass facilities normally outside IAEA jurisdiction, such as military facilities.
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
BOMBS AND TEARS
Lebanese PM denounces Israel's 'savage war machine', I think the PM need to negotiate with the terrorist out of this dilemma.
IDF: Hezbollah leaders' bunker hit
The conflict so far has caused "immeasurable loss" in Lebanon, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said Wednesday. He again called for a cease-fire and denounced Israel as a "savage war machine" responsible for more than 300 deaths in Lebanon.
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/19/mideast/index.html
Friday, July 14, 2006
Question of the day
Should the US launch a preemptive surgical strike against Tehran-Iran Nuclear Installations? When and how, if so?
Please respect other forum contributors' views.
Please respect other forum contributors' views.
The Genesis of the Nuclear Age
According to Global Security and the Nuclear Weapons Technology Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies, the following information was documented about Nuclear weapons.
Since their introduction in 1945, nuclear explosives have been the most feared of the weapons of mass destruction, in part because of their ability to cause enormous instantaneous devastation and of the persistent effects of the radiation they emit, unseen and undetectable by unaided human senses. The Manhattan Project cost the United States $2 billion in 1945 spending power and required the combined efforts of a continent-spanning industrial enterprise and a pool of scientists, many of whom had already been awarded the Nobel Prize and many more who would go on to become Nobel Laureates. This array of talent was needed in 1942 if there were to be any hope of completing a weapon during the Second World War. Because nuclear fission was discovered in Germany, which remained the home of many brilliant scientists, the United States perceived itself to be in a race to build an atomic bomb.
When the Manhattan Project began far less than a microgram of plutonium had been made throughout the world, and plutonium chemistry could only be guessed at; the numbers of neutrons released on average in U-235 and Pu-239 fissions were unknown; the fission cross sections (probabilities that an interaction would occur) were equally unknown, as was the neutron absorption cross section of carbon. Although talented people are essential to the success of any nuclear weapons program, the fundamental physics, chemistry, and engineering involved are widely understood; no basic research is required to construct a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a nuclear weapons project begun in 1996 does not require the brilliant scientists who were needed for the Manhattan Project.
For many decades the Manhattan Project provided the paradigm against which any potential proliferator’s efforts would be measured. Fifty years after the Trinity explosion, it has been recognized that the Manhattan Project is just one of a spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of a nuclear capability. At the low end of the scale, a nation may find a way to obtain a complete working nuclear bomb from a willing or unwilling supplier; at the other end, it may elect to construct a complete nuclear infrastructure including the mining of uranium, the enrichment of uranium metal in the fissile isotope U-235, the production and extraction of plutonium, the production of tritium, and the separation of deuterium and 6 Li to build thermonuclear weapons. At an intermediate level, the Republic of South Africa constructed six quite simple nuclear devices for a total project cost of less than $1 billion (1980’s purchasing power) using no more than 400 people and indigenous technology.
Fissile materials can produce energy by nuclear fission, either in nuclear reactors or in nuclear weapons. A country choosing to join the nuclear weapons community must acquire the necessary weapons (fissile) material (U-235 U or Pu-239). It is generally recognized that the acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons. Fissile material production consumes the vast majority of the technical, industrial, and financial resources required to produce nuclear weapons. For example, production of fissile materials —- highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium —- accounted for more than 80 percent of the $1.9 billion (1945 dollars) spent on the Manhattan Project.
Some analysts believe that the difficulties of enriching uranium are offset by the simpler weapon designs which enriched uranium allows. In the United States, HEU is considered less expensive to use in a weapon than plutonium. Operation of a reactor to produce plutonium requires the extraction and purification of uranium and, in some cases, at least modest enrichment. Given international safeguards on reactors using enriched uranium obtained from another nation or heavy water moderated reactors, a proliferant may be forced in any case to construct an enrichment facility. The choice is likely to be determined by the indigenous availability of uranium and the national surplus (or shortage) of electricity.
Acquisition of a militarily significant nuclear capability involves, however, more than simply the purchase or construction of a single nuclear device or weapon. It requires attention to issues of safety and handling of the weapons, reliability and predictability of entire systems, efficient use of scarce and valuable special nuclear material (SNM) (plutonium and enriched uranium), chains of custody and procedures for authorizing the use of the weapons, and the careful training of the military personnel who will deliver weapons to their targets.
In contrast, a nuclear device used for terrorism need not be constructed to survive a complex stockpile-to-target sequence, need not have a predictable and reliable yield, and need not be efficient in its use of nuclear material. Although major acts of terrorism are often rehearsed and the terrorists trained for the operation, the level of training probably is not remotely comparable to that necessary in a military establishment entrusted with the nuclear mission.
The United States has developed a complex and sophisticated system to ensure that nuclear weapons are used only on the orders of the President or his delegated representative. Some elements of the custodial system are the “two-man rule,” which requires that no person be left alone with a weapon; permissive action links (PALs), coded locks which prevent detonation of the weapon unless the correct combination is entered; and careful psychological testing of personnel charged with the custody or eventual use of nuclear weapons. In addition, U.S. nuclear weapons must be certified as “one point safe,” which means that there is less than a one-in-a-million chance of a nuclear yield greater than the equivalent of four pounds of TNT resulting from an accident in which the high explosive in the device is detonated at the point most likely to cause a nuclear yield.
It is believed to be unlikely that a new proliferator would insist upon one point safety as an inherent part of pit design; the United States did not until the late 1950’s, relying instead upon other means to prevent detonation (e.g., a component of Little Boy was not inserted until after the Enola Gay had departed Tinian for Hiroshima). It is also unlikely that a new actor in the nuclear world would insist upon fitting PALs to every (or to any) nuclear weapon; the United States did not equip its submarine-launched strategic ballistic missiles with PALs until, at the earliest, 1996, and the very first U.S. PALs were not introduced until the mid-1950’s, when American weapons were stationed at foreign bases where the possibility of theft or misuse was thought to be real.
Nonetheless, any possessor of nuclear weapons will take care that they are not used by unauthorized personnel and can be employed on the orders of duly constituted authority. Even -— or, perhaps, especially -— a dictator such as Saddam Hussein will insist upon a fairly sophisticated nuclear chain of command, if only to ensure that his weapons cannot be used by a revolutionary movement. It is also quite likely that even the newest proliferator would handle his weapons with care and seek to build some kind of safety devices and a reliable SAFF system into the units. On the basis of experience, one might expect to observe significant nuclear planning activity and the evolution of situation-specific nuclear doctrine on the part of a new proliferator who would have to allocate carefully the “family jewels.” The development of a nuclear strategy might be visible in the professional military literature of the proliferator.
Signatures
Every stage of nuclear weapon development, from material production to deployment, can generate signatures that provide some indication of a weapon program’s existence or status, although only a few of them point fairly unambiguously to a nuclear weapon program. The difficulty of producing fissile materials limits the rate at which a country could field nuclear weapons. If only a very small number of weapons were at hand, they might be reserved for strategic rather than battlefield use, thus reducing the need to conduct military exercises that anticipated combat in a nuclear environment. Furthermore, the weapons might be stored unassembled and their components kept at various locations. They might also be kept under the control of a small military or quasi-military unit outside of the regular military forces. It might be very difficult to detect a nuclear force still in its infancy solely by relying only on observable changes in deployment, storage facilities, or military operations. Materials production of nuclear weapons would still provide the greatest opportunities for detecting such a program.
Since their introduction in 1945, nuclear explosives have been the most feared of the weapons of mass destruction, in part because of their ability to cause enormous instantaneous devastation and of the persistent effects of the radiation they emit, unseen and undetectable by unaided human senses. The Manhattan Project cost the United States $2 billion in 1945 spending power and required the combined efforts of a continent-spanning industrial enterprise and a pool of scientists, many of whom had already been awarded the Nobel Prize and many more who would go on to become Nobel Laureates. This array of talent was needed in 1942 if there were to be any hope of completing a weapon during the Second World War. Because nuclear fission was discovered in Germany, which remained the home of many brilliant scientists, the United States perceived itself to be in a race to build an atomic bomb.
When the Manhattan Project began far less than a microgram of plutonium had been made throughout the world, and plutonium chemistry could only be guessed at; the numbers of neutrons released on average in U-235 and Pu-239 fissions were unknown; the fission cross sections (probabilities that an interaction would occur) were equally unknown, as was the neutron absorption cross section of carbon. Although talented people are essential to the success of any nuclear weapons program, the fundamental physics, chemistry, and engineering involved are widely understood; no basic research is required to construct a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a nuclear weapons project begun in 1996 does not require the brilliant scientists who were needed for the Manhattan Project.
For many decades the Manhattan Project provided the paradigm against which any potential proliferator’s efforts would be measured. Fifty years after the Trinity explosion, it has been recognized that the Manhattan Project is just one of a spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of a nuclear capability. At the low end of the scale, a nation may find a way to obtain a complete working nuclear bomb from a willing or unwilling supplier; at the other end, it may elect to construct a complete nuclear infrastructure including the mining of uranium, the enrichment of uranium metal in the fissile isotope U-235, the production and extraction of plutonium, the production of tritium, and the separation of deuterium and 6 Li to build thermonuclear weapons. At an intermediate level, the Republic of South Africa constructed six quite simple nuclear devices for a total project cost of less than $1 billion (1980’s purchasing power) using no more than 400 people and indigenous technology.
Fissile materials can produce energy by nuclear fission, either in nuclear reactors or in nuclear weapons. A country choosing to join the nuclear weapons community must acquire the necessary weapons (fissile) material (U-235 U or Pu-239). It is generally recognized that the acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons. Fissile material production consumes the vast majority of the technical, industrial, and financial resources required to produce nuclear weapons. For example, production of fissile materials —- highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium —- accounted for more than 80 percent of the $1.9 billion (1945 dollars) spent on the Manhattan Project.
Some analysts believe that the difficulties of enriching uranium are offset by the simpler weapon designs which enriched uranium allows. In the United States, HEU is considered less expensive to use in a weapon than plutonium. Operation of a reactor to produce plutonium requires the extraction and purification of uranium and, in some cases, at least modest enrichment. Given international safeguards on reactors using enriched uranium obtained from another nation or heavy water moderated reactors, a proliferant may be forced in any case to construct an enrichment facility. The choice is likely to be determined by the indigenous availability of uranium and the national surplus (or shortage) of electricity.
Acquisition of a militarily significant nuclear capability involves, however, more than simply the purchase or construction of a single nuclear device or weapon. It requires attention to issues of safety and handling of the weapons, reliability and predictability of entire systems, efficient use of scarce and valuable special nuclear material (SNM) (plutonium and enriched uranium), chains of custody and procedures for authorizing the use of the weapons, and the careful training of the military personnel who will deliver weapons to their targets.
In contrast, a nuclear device used for terrorism need not be constructed to survive a complex stockpile-to-target sequence, need not have a predictable and reliable yield, and need not be efficient in its use of nuclear material. Although major acts of terrorism are often rehearsed and the terrorists trained for the operation, the level of training probably is not remotely comparable to that necessary in a military establishment entrusted with the nuclear mission.
The United States has developed a complex and sophisticated system to ensure that nuclear weapons are used only on the orders of the President or his delegated representative. Some elements of the custodial system are the “two-man rule,” which requires that no person be left alone with a weapon; permissive action links (PALs), coded locks which prevent detonation of the weapon unless the correct combination is entered; and careful psychological testing of personnel charged with the custody or eventual use of nuclear weapons. In addition, U.S. nuclear weapons must be certified as “one point safe,” which means that there is less than a one-in-a-million chance of a nuclear yield greater than the equivalent of four pounds of TNT resulting from an accident in which the high explosive in the device is detonated at the point most likely to cause a nuclear yield.
It is believed to be unlikely that a new proliferator would insist upon one point safety as an inherent part of pit design; the United States did not until the late 1950’s, relying instead upon other means to prevent detonation (e.g., a component of Little Boy was not inserted until after the Enola Gay had departed Tinian for Hiroshima). It is also unlikely that a new actor in the nuclear world would insist upon fitting PALs to every (or to any) nuclear weapon; the United States did not equip its submarine-launched strategic ballistic missiles with PALs until, at the earliest, 1996, and the very first U.S. PALs were not introduced until the mid-1950’s, when American weapons were stationed at foreign bases where the possibility of theft or misuse was thought to be real.
Nonetheless, any possessor of nuclear weapons will take care that they are not used by unauthorized personnel and can be employed on the orders of duly constituted authority. Even -— or, perhaps, especially -— a dictator such as Saddam Hussein will insist upon a fairly sophisticated nuclear chain of command, if only to ensure that his weapons cannot be used by a revolutionary movement. It is also quite likely that even the newest proliferator would handle his weapons with care and seek to build some kind of safety devices and a reliable SAFF system into the units. On the basis of experience, one might expect to observe significant nuclear planning activity and the evolution of situation-specific nuclear doctrine on the part of a new proliferator who would have to allocate carefully the “family jewels.” The development of a nuclear strategy might be visible in the professional military literature of the proliferator.
Signatures
Every stage of nuclear weapon development, from material production to deployment, can generate signatures that provide some indication of a weapon program’s existence or status, although only a few of them point fairly unambiguously to a nuclear weapon program. The difficulty of producing fissile materials limits the rate at which a country could field nuclear weapons. If only a very small number of weapons were at hand, they might be reserved for strategic rather than battlefield use, thus reducing the need to conduct military exercises that anticipated combat in a nuclear environment. Furthermore, the weapons might be stored unassembled and their components kept at various locations. They might also be kept under the control of a small military or quasi-military unit outside of the regular military forces. It might be very difficult to detect a nuclear force still in its infancy solely by relying only on observable changes in deployment, storage facilities, or military operations. Materials production of nuclear weapons would still provide the greatest opportunities for detecting such a program.
Nippon Need US Support to Vote on UN Sanctions Against North Korea
As usual, the UN is not articulating its position on North Korean Nuclear and Missile programs.
However, our major ally Japan is pushing the United Nations Security Council to time a vote on a resolution about North Korea's missile tests to coincide with the start of the Group of Eight summit of leading industrialized countries.
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso mentioned it is time for the United Nations Security Council to vote on a resolution concerning North Korea's July 5 missile tests.
Aso notes that Japan wants the issue resolved by the end of the day in New York. That is shortly before the Group of Eight leaders convene in Russia for their annual summit.
I have done some research on the nuclear club members (informal and formal). (See below).
US
Russia
United Kingdom
France China
Israel
India Pakistan North Korea
Weapons
Stockpile
10,640
16,000
200
350
?400
200
110-150 75
~13
Deliverable
6,390
3,242
200
350
~325
200
110
75
~13
ICBM
Number
500
497
24
Warheads
1,320
1,770
24
Type
MM II : 0
MM III: 500
MX PK : 12
SS-18: 148
SS-19: 35
SS-24: 36
SS-25: 300
SS-27: 40
DF-5: 24
IRBM, MRBM
Number 100
100
70
100
100
Warheads
100
100
+50
65
8
Type DF-3 : 40
DF-4 : 12
DF-21: 48 Jericho 1 : 50
Jericho 2 : 50
Prithvi : 70
Agni : 20
Shaheen-I : 34
Shaheen-II : 15
Ghauri : 50
ND-1 : 100
SLBM
Number 360
192
58
64
12
24
Warheads
2,880
672
~200
384
12
24
However, our major ally Japan is pushing the United Nations Security Council to time a vote on a resolution about North Korea's missile tests to coincide with the start of the Group of Eight summit of leading industrialized countries.
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso mentioned it is time for the United Nations Security Council to vote on a resolution concerning North Korea's July 5 missile tests.
Aso notes that Japan wants the issue resolved by the end of the day in New York. That is shortly before the Group of Eight leaders convene in Russia for their annual summit.
I have done some research on the nuclear club members (informal and formal). (See below).
US
Russia
United Kingdom
France China
Israel
India Pakistan North Korea
Weapons
Stockpile
10,640
16,000
200
350
?400
200
110-150 75
~13
Deliverable
6,390
3,242
200
350
~325
200
110
75
~13
ICBM
Number
500
497
24
Warheads
1,320
1,770
24
Type
MM II : 0
MM III: 500
MX PK : 12
SS-18: 148
SS-19: 35
SS-24: 36
SS-25: 300
SS-27: 40
DF-5: 24
IRBM, MRBM
Number 100
100
70
100
100
Warheads
100
100
+50
65
8
Type DF-3 : 40
DF-4 : 12
DF-21: 48 Jericho 1 : 50
Jericho 2 : 50
Prithvi : 70
Agni : 20
Shaheen-I : 34
Shaheen-II : 15
Ghauri : 50
ND-1 : 100
SLBM
Number 360
192
58
64
12
24
Warheads
2,880
672
~200
384
12
24
Bush to press Israel to curb civilian casualties
President Bush stand firm on what he sees as a ploy by Islamisists to intimidate our ally. He called for restrait---that is fantastically brilliant-Mr. President!!!! Europeans and ironically, Germany condemned Israel--Europe could not protect the Jews against Hitler and they have shown during the G-8 meeting in Russia that, Europeans are far than ever to correctly understand important events with grave ramifications--what a shame!!
Israel destroys Hezbollah headquarters
Today a number of media networks reported Israeli air strikes, one destroyed a main Hezbollah office in Beirut’s southern suburb as Israel tightened its seal on Lebanon going into the weekend. As I've said all along, the conflict can only be diffused if Syria and Iran suddenly decide to became responsible members of the civilized world. In the meantime, Israeli forces will continue there offensive deep into Beirut and Iran and Syria should be worried right now-they're potential targets this weeked and thereafter.
Thursday, July 13, 2006
Israel attacks, after Hezbollah lobs rockets
The Middle East is again the center of world focus as the leaders of the elite economic giants meet in Russia in coming days. The two front war, threatening two other fronts with Damascus and Tehran is a mojor cause of concern. Today, violence spill into major parts of Labanon-leavind dozen civilians deat and according to CNN report about 10 Israel citizen. In a meantime, Israeli figher jets launched an assault on the main highway between Beirut and the Syrian capital of Damascus.
The Tragedy of the Triple Power Game in the Pacific: Why UN-Diplomacy Will Not Remove the North Korea Menace.
It has been days since the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il in a blatant defiance of its so-called closest ally China and other major players in the region. There is NO soft or strong word from the United Nations and the United States government reaction at best has yet to meet minimally acceptable American response, why? First, one needs to understand the three great powers relations in the region that is the United States, Russia and PRC. And second, diplomacy is impotent without the threat of military coercion; more so in case North Korea.
The United States is the singular superpower today because it is the only state that currently possesses great power in all the main grouping of power (economic, military, informational, and political) and the will to exercise such power to advance its national interests and offer global leadership.
The EU has economic strength (its GDP exceeds that of the U.S.) and two of its members have strategic nuclear weapons, but it presently lacks the unity and will to attain a state of the art military with sizeable power projection capability. Russia and China have strategic nuclear weapons, but lack economic potency; though China’s economic trends are striking.
Russia’s instability and economic crisis also have greatly weakened its previously frightening conventional military power capabilities. China’s military is large but ancient. The United States is the world leader in soft power given the pervasiveness of American culture around the world and the pre-eminence of the American-championed ideas of democracy and capitalism—as well as in the information technologies through which such ideas and culture are so widely disseminate. Globalization, therefore, tends to reinforce U.S. power. To challenge U.S. ascendancy, a state or alliance of states must above all be able to rival the U.S. militarily, for which economic strength is essential.
Russia and China feel exposed by U.S. dominance, each of these power centers perceives it to be in their interest to be able to balance U.S. power and is taking steps in that direction, though they differ in their motives and in their capacity for success. Japan currently does not appear to be seeking to balance U.S. power, though there are elements within Japan that have voiced support for doing so. Japan may choose to do so in the future. India’s size and nuclear weapons give it great power potential, but it is likely to be preoccupied and inhibited by internal challenges for the predictable future.
Russian loathing toward U.S. dominance stems both from hurt pride and perceived threats to real interests. Universal recognition of the United States as the world’s sole superpower since the Soviet Union’s demise is a constant, bitter reminder to the Russians of just how far they have fallen. Early hopes held by Russia that the United States would continue to treat them like a superpower, and those held by the United States that Russia would support the U.S. vision for a New World Order—hopes that made possible the broad coalition that removed Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 have since been dashed. Russia’s incapacitated military and heavy dependence on Western lending have compelled it to give ground to U.S. pressure on a number of issues important to it, most recently Chechnya and Central Asia, which has only intensified Russian resentment.
Other than pride, Russia recognizes that the United States is the essential proponent for NATO expansion, a development that Russians widely perceive as threatening to their national interests. Cash-strapped Russia, with its few internationally competitive industries, also resents and is economically constrained by U.S. pressure not to make profitable arms and commercial nuclear power sales to U.S. defined rogue states, e.g. Iran.
For China, the United States is the prime foreign obstacle to the achievement of some of China’s most important foreign policy goals, including reunification with Taiwan and supremacy, in Asia. U.S. criticism of China’s human rights performance has been a continuing source of tension. China also has made its concerns about the recent strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship and U.S. theater missile defense cooperation with Japan and Taiwan. Pride is likely another motivating factor for China, given its great power past and more recent humiliations by stronger powers.
Why UN-Diplomacy Will Fail? Politics
China’s uncertain intentions in the region: Though U.S. officials have praised
China’s assistance in recent U.S. interactions with North Korea, Beijing is wary both of U.S. intentions in Northeast Asia and of increasing Japanese-South Korean collaboration, whether military cooperation or concerted efforts to try to influence North Korean behavior through food aid. At the same time, the PRC wishes to continue its lucrative trading relationship with South Korea and, ultimately, would like to see the departure of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. China, which has suffered from North Korean refugee inflows since the mid-1990s, would logically prefer a stable, non-threatening, self-sustaining North Korea.
Russia wants the United States to continue being bogged down in conflicts and hatred from other nations. The more Russia seems to differ on a policy issue, the worse US look to the rest of the world. Like China, Russia has consistently blocked US diplomatic initiatives on Iran and North Korea. It may seem counter-productive to many of us that Russia and China would fail to take proliferation activities seriously, however, for China and Russia—these two rogue states represent the spinal-cord of their political fortunes. Both these countries have absolutely nothing noteworthy to undermine the United States, except using their UN-Security Council to relentlessly render it unable to resolve international threats.
The United State's relation with Japan and South Korea makes it unlikely that a strong diplomatic front could be mustered. Japan to her credit want a clear—resolute international response, South Korea is still unable to shake off her tendency to view threats as only originating from Tokyo. Although the history between Seoul and Tokyo is quite complicated, it is regrettable that the recent provocative moves by the Stalinist regime up north on the Korean Peninsula would be treated with laughable outrage from the Blue House. Here again, the United States cannot move diplomatically decisively because of another layer of complication induced by Seoul and US’s commitments to Both ROK and Japan.
What should be done?
The United States with preferably, or without a UN-Resolution should move in with tougher-punitive sanctions against North Korea—for example, the US Navy should enforce a blockade on all shipments but humanitarian cargos. Second, we should destroy North Korea missile launch pads promptly, they should not be able to announce to the world their launches, in defiance, and proceed without grave repercussions. Third, surgical strikes on the leadership and nuclear or other WMD plants should be an option, and the United States forces in Japan and South Korea should be put the highest level of alert. In a meantime, diplomatic venues at the United Nations should be explored to avert a large scale confrontation shoot out on the Peninsula. If the possibility of war imminent the Russia, PRC, ROK and DPRK are likely to show deliberate sense of urgency in diffusing the situation. North Korea violated the NPT, Framework Agreements, other protocol and pronouncements with the United States, and the International community in general. If the PRC, Russia and ROK cannot band together to arrest this tide, and the UN-Security Council is still under siege from China and Russia; the US as a pacific power, as it has done on numerous occasions in her 230 year history must act and act soon to remove the menace.
The United States is the singular superpower today because it is the only state that currently possesses great power in all the main grouping of power (economic, military, informational, and political) and the will to exercise such power to advance its national interests and offer global leadership.
The EU has economic strength (its GDP exceeds that of the U.S.) and two of its members have strategic nuclear weapons, but it presently lacks the unity and will to attain a state of the art military with sizeable power projection capability. Russia and China have strategic nuclear weapons, but lack economic potency; though China’s economic trends are striking.
Russia’s instability and economic crisis also have greatly weakened its previously frightening conventional military power capabilities. China’s military is large but ancient. The United States is the world leader in soft power given the pervasiveness of American culture around the world and the pre-eminence of the American-championed ideas of democracy and capitalism—as well as in the information technologies through which such ideas and culture are so widely disseminate. Globalization, therefore, tends to reinforce U.S. power. To challenge U.S. ascendancy, a state or alliance of states must above all be able to rival the U.S. militarily, for which economic strength is essential.
Russia and China feel exposed by U.S. dominance, each of these power centers perceives it to be in their interest to be able to balance U.S. power and is taking steps in that direction, though they differ in their motives and in their capacity for success. Japan currently does not appear to be seeking to balance U.S. power, though there are elements within Japan that have voiced support for doing so. Japan may choose to do so in the future. India’s size and nuclear weapons give it great power potential, but it is likely to be preoccupied and inhibited by internal challenges for the predictable future.
Russian loathing toward U.S. dominance stems both from hurt pride and perceived threats to real interests. Universal recognition of the United States as the world’s sole superpower since the Soviet Union’s demise is a constant, bitter reminder to the Russians of just how far they have fallen. Early hopes held by Russia that the United States would continue to treat them like a superpower, and those held by the United States that Russia would support the U.S. vision for a New World Order—hopes that made possible the broad coalition that removed Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 have since been dashed. Russia’s incapacitated military and heavy dependence on Western lending have compelled it to give ground to U.S. pressure on a number of issues important to it, most recently Chechnya and Central Asia, which has only intensified Russian resentment.
Other than pride, Russia recognizes that the United States is the essential proponent for NATO expansion, a development that Russians widely perceive as threatening to their national interests. Cash-strapped Russia, with its few internationally competitive industries, also resents and is economically constrained by U.S. pressure not to make profitable arms and commercial nuclear power sales to U.S. defined rogue states, e.g. Iran.
For China, the United States is the prime foreign obstacle to the achievement of some of China’s most important foreign policy goals, including reunification with Taiwan and supremacy, in Asia. U.S. criticism of China’s human rights performance has been a continuing source of tension. China also has made its concerns about the recent strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship and U.S. theater missile defense cooperation with Japan and Taiwan. Pride is likely another motivating factor for China, given its great power past and more recent humiliations by stronger powers.
Why UN-Diplomacy Will Fail? Politics
China’s uncertain intentions in the region: Though U.S. officials have praised
China’s assistance in recent U.S. interactions with North Korea, Beijing is wary both of U.S. intentions in Northeast Asia and of increasing Japanese-South Korean collaboration, whether military cooperation or concerted efforts to try to influence North Korean behavior through food aid. At the same time, the PRC wishes to continue its lucrative trading relationship with South Korea and, ultimately, would like to see the departure of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. China, which has suffered from North Korean refugee inflows since the mid-1990s, would logically prefer a stable, non-threatening, self-sustaining North Korea.
Russia wants the United States to continue being bogged down in conflicts and hatred from other nations. The more Russia seems to differ on a policy issue, the worse US look to the rest of the world. Like China, Russia has consistently blocked US diplomatic initiatives on Iran and North Korea. It may seem counter-productive to many of us that Russia and China would fail to take proliferation activities seriously, however, for China and Russia—these two rogue states represent the spinal-cord of their political fortunes. Both these countries have absolutely nothing noteworthy to undermine the United States, except using their UN-Security Council to relentlessly render it unable to resolve international threats.
The United State's relation with Japan and South Korea makes it unlikely that a strong diplomatic front could be mustered. Japan to her credit want a clear—resolute international response, South Korea is still unable to shake off her tendency to view threats as only originating from Tokyo. Although the history between Seoul and Tokyo is quite complicated, it is regrettable that the recent provocative moves by the Stalinist regime up north on the Korean Peninsula would be treated with laughable outrage from the Blue House. Here again, the United States cannot move diplomatically decisively because of another layer of complication induced by Seoul and US’s commitments to Both ROK and Japan.
What should be done?
The United States with preferably, or without a UN-Resolution should move in with tougher-punitive sanctions against North Korea—for example, the US Navy should enforce a blockade on all shipments but humanitarian cargos. Second, we should destroy North Korea missile launch pads promptly, they should not be able to announce to the world their launches, in defiance, and proceed without grave repercussions. Third, surgical strikes on the leadership and nuclear or other WMD plants should be an option, and the United States forces in Japan and South Korea should be put the highest level of alert. In a meantime, diplomatic venues at the United Nations should be explored to avert a large scale confrontation shoot out on the Peninsula. If the possibility of war imminent the Russia, PRC, ROK and DPRK are likely to show deliberate sense of urgency in diffusing the situation. North Korea violated the NPT, Framework Agreements, other protocol and pronouncements with the United States, and the International community in general. If the PRC, Russia and ROK cannot band together to arrest this tide, and the UN-Security Council is still under siege from China and Russia; the US as a pacific power, as it has done on numerous occasions in her 230 year history must act and act soon to remove the menace.
What are China's main and major goals and interests in East Asia
In general China main goal is to maintain better relations with its neighbors. For Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas, China’s goal is to simultaneously maintain amicable relations while countering external security threats and destabilizing influences within its borders from minority peoples stirred up by their ethnic conflicts. This stance spills over into such problem areas as China’s claims on Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China’s Sea. While Russia was long perceived as the greatest single threat to China's security, potential threats from the United States, Japan, and Taiwan are top priorities therefore stresses a strong national defense so as to avoid containment by these surrounding countries and to create a diplomatic environment conducive to China's interests. The reunification between Taiwan and the mainland is imperative to the Chinese leadership. It is a matter territorial integrity and national independence, certainly a security issue which China considers to be a top priority. As one Chinese diplomat eloquently put it “the basic policy of the Chinese Government to solve this issue is "peaceful reunification" and "one country, two systems". The great concept of "one country, two systems" has been smoothly applied in Hong Kong.”
A second major priority is pursuing an independent foreign policy as a vehicle for exerting greater leadership and influence in the East Asia. China's goals appear to be to resist superpower domination and outside interference while enhancing its own relations with the developing world so as to create a global political and diplomatic environment advantageous to its interests. In pursuit of these goals, China has toned down its highly ideological emphasis on socialism in favor of a realistic, flexible approach to diplomatic relations. For example recently economic aid is being extended to repressive regimes in Africa (Angola and Zimbabwe).
China seeks to build a constructive strategic partnership with the United States through cooperation to meet international challenges and promote peace and development in the world. Also China's security concerns comes from its neighbors, in particular: the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan .The greatest worry with regard to the Korean peninsula is that chaos and instability there might spill over into the ethnic Korean community living in Chinese territory and disrupt peace in the border regions. Taiwan remains a matter of China's national sovereignty, and thus a matter of particular concern.
China strives to improve foreign relations with its neighbors to create a better security environment for itself at the same time as it continues to build a strong national defense to support its basic strategic goals and to protect its national interests. This approach lies at the heart of a Chinese independent diplomatic policy that rejects interference and attempts at hegemony by other major powers. A strong national defense simultaneously serves to strengthen the government's hand in maintaining stability within its own borders and to expand Chinese influence in the East Asia by modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces, its increased military deployment in the South China Sea.
In summary, China’s main goal and national interests can be broadly classified and distributed into three major areas, security, economic and diplomatic in that order. However, as the Cold War experience vividly demonstrates, the East Asian “Giant” will have to adjust her national objectives and interests to cope with the dynamism in this region of the world (East Asia). China also sees a challenging international security environment and is apprehensive about several international security trends. It is particularly concerned about the perceived US "containment” and military “encirclement” of China, US national defense programs, and the potential for Japan to improve her regional force projection capabilities. Taiwan, however, is China's main security focus, and it is the biggest problem, both politically and militarily, in China-US relations. The issues of continuing US arms sales in the region remain problematic for the future.
A second major priority is pursuing an independent foreign policy as a vehicle for exerting greater leadership and influence in the East Asia. China's goals appear to be to resist superpower domination and outside interference while enhancing its own relations with the developing world so as to create a global political and diplomatic environment advantageous to its interests. In pursuit of these goals, China has toned down its highly ideological emphasis on socialism in favor of a realistic, flexible approach to diplomatic relations. For example recently economic aid is being extended to repressive regimes in Africa (Angola and Zimbabwe).
China seeks to build a constructive strategic partnership with the United States through cooperation to meet international challenges and promote peace and development in the world. Also China's security concerns comes from its neighbors, in particular: the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan .The greatest worry with regard to the Korean peninsula is that chaos and instability there might spill over into the ethnic Korean community living in Chinese territory and disrupt peace in the border regions. Taiwan remains a matter of China's national sovereignty, and thus a matter of particular concern.
China strives to improve foreign relations with its neighbors to create a better security environment for itself at the same time as it continues to build a strong national defense to support its basic strategic goals and to protect its national interests. This approach lies at the heart of a Chinese independent diplomatic policy that rejects interference and attempts at hegemony by other major powers. A strong national defense simultaneously serves to strengthen the government's hand in maintaining stability within its own borders and to expand Chinese influence in the East Asia by modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces, its increased military deployment in the South China Sea.
In summary, China’s main goal and national interests can be broadly classified and distributed into three major areas, security, economic and diplomatic in that order. However, as the Cold War experience vividly demonstrates, the East Asian “Giant” will have to adjust her national objectives and interests to cope with the dynamism in this region of the world (East Asia). China also sees a challenging international security environment and is apprehensive about several international security trends. It is particularly concerned about the perceived US "containment” and military “encirclement” of China, US national defense programs, and the potential for Japan to improve her regional force projection capabilities. Taiwan, however, is China's main security focus, and it is the biggest problem, both politically and militarily, in China-US relations. The issues of continuing US arms sales in the region remain problematic for the future.
Assessment of US interest in Northeast Asia.
Northeast Asia,--China, Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia and Pacific Russia remain politically suspicious of each other and economically un-integrated. Recently however, the growing importance of economic on foreign policy agendas has led to a call to multilateral economic cooperation at the regional level. It is in this context that the US national interest can be articulated; these include regional stability, regional cooperation, humanitarian concerns, maintaining a military presence in the Indian Ocean, inculcation of western values and maintain the flow of oil. However the later aims have generally taken a back seat in the overall US-Northeast Asia.
For the past 50 years the United States has preached the virtues of free trade. But in practice the U.S. security guarantees have facilitated in particular East Asian mercantilism in an effort to keep an anti soviet alliance together. This Cold War strategy makes less and less sense as the U.S. economy continue decline in relative terms and the Soviet threat continues to diminish.
East Asia’s superior economic performance, a performance that is underwritten by U.S. security guarantees—sustained over a long period will inexorably lead to long-term strategic superiority over the United States. To prevent this from happening, the United States needs to realign its security and economic objectives by scraping its Cold War security strategy. In its place the United States should move to build a regional security institution that will draw Japan more deeply into a power-sharing role in the region. Now that the Soviets are no longer a threat, including their satellite states, China increasingly focused its intentions on economic reforms and growth. Vietnam’s relationship with her neighbors in Northeast Asia improved. Only North Korea appears to be the remaining clear-cut threat.
The 1990’s produced two more trends that made it increasingly difficult for the United States to identify the enemies which U.S. forces are defending against in Asia. The collapse of the Soviet block and the sweeping redistribution of economic power from the United States to Asia, in general given these changes the Unites States now has the opportunity to realign its strategic and economic priorities. By virtue of its military superpower status, the United States will still have a balancing role to play in Northeast Asia. But the U.S has much more room for choice as to how actively it wishes to play that role and whether it wishes to share that responsibility with Japan, China and Korea.
In sum, a continuation of our Cold War National Interest Strategy in Northeast is not a building block for a new international order. The U.S policy since the end of the Cold War is quite incoherent, it is time for a change in the U.S, approach—time to build on our past successes, time to elevate our own economic concerns and military needs in face of the global war on terrorism and time to express confidence in Northeast Asians that they are ready to help us chart a new richer, and more pacific future for Asia in the 21st century.
For the past 50 years the United States has preached the virtues of free trade. But in practice the U.S. security guarantees have facilitated in particular East Asian mercantilism in an effort to keep an anti soviet alliance together. This Cold War strategy makes less and less sense as the U.S. economy continue decline in relative terms and the Soviet threat continues to diminish.
East Asia’s superior economic performance, a performance that is underwritten by U.S. security guarantees—sustained over a long period will inexorably lead to long-term strategic superiority over the United States. To prevent this from happening, the United States needs to realign its security and economic objectives by scraping its Cold War security strategy. In its place the United States should move to build a regional security institution that will draw Japan more deeply into a power-sharing role in the region. Now that the Soviets are no longer a threat, including their satellite states, China increasingly focused its intentions on economic reforms and growth. Vietnam’s relationship with her neighbors in Northeast Asia improved. Only North Korea appears to be the remaining clear-cut threat.
The 1990’s produced two more trends that made it increasingly difficult for the United States to identify the enemies which U.S. forces are defending against in Asia. The collapse of the Soviet block and the sweeping redistribution of economic power from the United States to Asia, in general given these changes the Unites States now has the opportunity to realign its strategic and economic priorities. By virtue of its military superpower status, the United States will still have a balancing role to play in Northeast Asia. But the U.S has much more room for choice as to how actively it wishes to play that role and whether it wishes to share that responsibility with Japan, China and Korea.
In sum, a continuation of our Cold War National Interest Strategy in Northeast is not a building block for a new international order. The U.S policy since the end of the Cold War is quite incoherent, it is time for a change in the U.S, approach—time to build on our past successes, time to elevate our own economic concerns and military needs in face of the global war on terrorism and time to express confidence in Northeast Asians that they are ready to help us chart a new richer, and more pacific future for Asia in the 21st century.
THE US SUPERPOWER: IS CHINA AND RUSSIA POISED TO CURTAIL AMERICAN DOMINANCE? WHAT ABOUT EUROPEANS?
As a student of Foreign Policy and International Security, I have an intimate curiosity in issues of power dynamics. Indeed, as the economic and political hegemony of the United States continue to diminish relative to other nations, I feel it is imperative to explore, probe and reliably predict the future of the world polar system; so the world is never caught off-guard. The neo-realist balance of power replica requires states to seek to provide for their own security in a fundamentally anarchic international system by balancing the power of other states that pose or could pose a threat to their national interests (Walt 1998). Consistent with this scheme, this essay endeavors to show that the United States’ current status as the world’s sole superpower is impelling on China, Russia and to least degree other states, including some U.S. allies, to seek to balance U.S. power. This dynamic likely will contribute to the reemergence of a multi-polar or bipolar world in the mid 21st Century, the U.S. should prepare for this likelihood.
This paper raises generous questions that will be addressed in turn. First, what other state, view the U.S. as a present or likely threat such that they seek to balance U.S. power, and why? Second, how do these states seek to balance U.S. power? Third, what do these efforts foretell the nature of the next century’s international system? Finally, what are the implications for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st Century?
On Power
The United States is the singular superpower today because it is the only state that currently possesses great power in all the main grouping of power (economic, military, informational, and political) and the will to exercise such power to advance its national interests and offer global leadership (Jablonsky1997).The EU has economic strength (its GDP exceeds that of the U.S.) and two of its members have strategic nuclear weapons, but it presently lacks the unity and will to attain a state of the art military with sizeable power projection capability. Russia and China have strategic nuclear weapons, but lack economic potency; though China’s economic trends are striking (Yahuda 1996). Russia’s instability and economic crisis also have greatly weakened its previously frightening conventional military power capabilities. China’s military is large but ancient. The United States is the world leader in soft power given the pervasiveness of American culture around the world and the pre-eminence of the American-championed ideas of democracy and capitalism—as well as in the information technologies through which such ideas and culture are so widely disseminated ( Keohane and Nye1998).Globalization, therefore, tends to reinforce U.S. power. To challenge U.S. ascendancy, a state or alliance of states must above all be able to rival the U.S. militarily, for which economic strength is essential.
Who is Seeking to Balance U.S. Power and Why?
Russia and China feel exposed by U.S. dominance, each of these power centers perceives it to be in their interest to be able to balance U.S. power and is taking steps in that direction, though they differ in their motives and in their capacity for success (Eikenberry 1999). Japan currently does not appear to be seeking to balance U.S. power, though there are elements within Japan that have voiced support for doing so. Japan may choose to do so in the future. India’s size and nuclear weapons give it great power potential, but it is likely to be preoccupied and inhibited by internal challenges for the predictable future.
Russian loathing toward U.S. dominance stems both from hurt pride and perceived threats to real interests. Universal recognition of the United States as the world’s sole superpower since the Soviet Union’s demise is a constant, bitter reminder to the Russians of just how far they have fallen. Early hopes held by Russia that the United States would continue to treat them like a superpower, and those held by the United States that Russia would support the U.S. vision for a New World Order—hopes that made possible the broad coalition that removed Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 have since been dashed. Russia’s incapacitated military and heavy dependence on Western lending have compelled it to give ground to U.S. pressure on a number of issues important to it, most recently Chechnya and Central Asia, which has only intensified Russian resentment.
Further than pride, Russia recognizes that the United States is the essential proponent for NATO expansion, a development that Russians widely perceive as threatening to their national interests. Cash-strapped Russia, with its few internationally competitive industries, also resents and is economically constrained by U.S. pressure not to make profitable arms and commercial nuclear power sales to U.S. defined rogue states, e.g. Iran (NewsMax.com 2005).
For China, the United States is the prime foreign obstacle to the achievement of some of China’s most important foreign policy goals, including reunification with Taiwan and supremacy, in Asia. U.S. criticism of China’s human rights performance has been a continuing source of tension (Sutter & Przystup 1996 and Zhang 2000). China also has made understandable its concerns about the recent strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship and U.S. theater missile defense cooperation with Japan and Taiwan (Sutter & Przystup 1996). Pride is likely another motivating factor for China, given its great power past and more recent humiliations by stronger powers (Mann 1999).
Less instantaneously apparent is what motivates Europeans to balance U.S. power. Does not the U.S. accord its European allies a high level of security, which they could provide for themselves only with far greater investment in their own defense? Are not the values and systems that the U.S. promotes and protects shared by and beneficial to the Europeans? The answers to these questions are yes, but with costs and risks. One cost is psychological: As with Russia and China, pride partly motivates Europe’s antipathy toward U.S. dominance. This great power envy is most pronounced in France, but is not limited to that European power. Consider Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos’ prideful (and ultimately wrong) assertion, on behalf of the European Community, at the start of the Bosnian crisis in 1991 that “the hour of Europe has dawned” and that Europe could handle that crisis without America’s assistance (The New Republic 1995).
One peril perceived by the Europeans is not that the U.S. will exercise its power in a threatening manner but that it will cease to exercise it at all, or at least reliably. This is the fear of an American return to isolationism or of an American turn eastward as Asia’s economic importance to the U.S. increases relative to that of Europe. Kosovo and Bosnia underscored, to many Europeans’ concern, how utterly dependent the Europeans remain upon U.S. political leadership and military muscle to respond effectively to crises in their own region, much less to those further afield.
The Europeans also recognize that there are prospects associated with being in a position to rival U.S. power and leadership. EU member states have increased their leverage vis-à-vis the United States on economic matters by negotiating as a single entity vice many. If the euro eventually displaces the dollar as the international reserve currency of choice, the associated benefits of being able to sustain higher budget and current account deficits will accrue more to Europe than to America.
How Are They Seeking to Balance U.S. Power?
Power can be balanced in two ways. The first way is for a state to seek to enhance its local power. The second is for a state to aggregate its power with that of other states through alliances, a state also can pursue both ways concurrently.
Russia, China, and the EU each are seeking to develop their own power, but only the EU (Japan, too, should it choose to do so) currently possesses the economic strength necessary to rival U.S. power solely through its own efforts. Russia and China’s economic under-development mean that they have far to go before they can rival U.S. power individually, so they will need to align with others to better balance U.S. power.
Europe’s drive to closer integration, currently discernible in the EU and the euro, can be understood to an important extent as a means to balance U.S. power. The initial drive for union was driven by a desire to bring together the European states in a way that would preclude future wars among them, particularly between France and Germany. By the 1970s, however, that goal could be viewed as largely achieved. Enhanced prosperity is another, continuing motive as EU member states seek to achieve greater economic efficiencies by eliminating barriers to trade among themselves and improving their international negotiating position. But if prosperity is the EU member states’ only other purpose, why do they pursue political integration, particularly the achievement of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)?
While EU member states together now deal with the United States on economic matters as a peer, they remain far from that status with regard to political matters, particularly those involving the use of force. This reflects the greater reticence of some major EU member states to pool sovereignty on matters of blood, which are more serious than matters of treasure. It also reflects a failure to invest in leading edge defense capabilities, such as precision guided munitions, reconnaissance, and strategic lift.
EU members, however, have undertaken to redress at least partially their military dependence upon the United States. The vehicle has come to be known as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) initiative. France originated the concept of developing a stronger and more cohesive European military instrument than the Western European Union (WEU) that could act independently of the United States. The United States feared that the development of a European military capability outside of NATO would weaken the transatlantic alliance.
Russia and China currently lack the level of development and, particularly in Russia’s case, internal stability to be able to rival U.S. power, military or economic, in the near term. They will, of course, seek to raise their level of development as do all nations for reasons both domestic and international. In the meantime, however, their only option for balancing U.S. power is through alliance with other powers (Yahuda 1996). Accordingly, we see evidence of Russia and China moving closer to one another for just that purpose. Since the Cold War’s end, Russian and Chinese leaders have discussed their need to cooperate to balance U.S. power (Rashid 1999). They have moved to resolve outstanding border disputes and to reduce the forces each stations along that border (Washington Post, Dec 28, 1996). Russia is again selling and China is again buying sophisticated combat aircraft and other arms from Russia. Such developments contrast sharply with their previous difficulty, even hostile, relations (Yahuda 1996).
A fragile Russia, unlike a strong Soviet Union, is not a strategic threat to China but a potential strategic partner against the only country currently able to seriously obstruct China’s international wellbeing, the United States. For Russia, alliance with China gives it greater weight vis-à-vis the U.S. and Europe at a time of exceptional weakness and it does so at relatively little current risk (Yahuda 1996). China currently lacks a modern military, and it is giving priority to its domestic economic development over modernizing its armed forces. Russia must be the more careful partner in this configuration, however. On current trends, and given their relative population resource bases, China looks likely to emerge eventually as a much stronger power than Russia. With more territory than any other country in the world, a population roughly a tenth of China’s (and concentrated in the west), and the only major power with a ground border with China, Russia could one day become China’s strategic target instead of its strategic partner. Down the road, Russia may need to align with others, including possibly Europe and the United States, against China (Pirchner 2003).
What are the Implications?
Russian, Chinese, and European efforts to balance U.S. power promise significant change for the international system in the 21st century. The specific changes will depend upon the success of these balancing efforts as well as on the United States’ own actions.
It is uncertain whether the European Union will muster the unity and will necessary to rival the United States militarily. Defense is more central to sovereignty than economics, and it is in the area of defense that EU member states have ceded the least sovereignty to Brussels.
The harshness of Russia’s current political and economic problems and the diminishment of its great power potential as a result of the loss of population and territory following the Soviet Union’s demise make it unlikely that Russia will reemerge as a global rival to the United States. Russia may yet achieve internal stability and turn its economy around, but even then will likely depend on alliance in some form with another power center to protect its vital interests in the future. Its initial alliance is likely to be with China, but as previously discussed, it may later need to look west to balance China.
China, in the near-term, is likely to increase its strategic cooperation with Russia in order to mitigate U.S. power, as discussed above. Unlike Russia, China has the potential over the longer term to challenge U.S. supremacy directly—indeed, to emerge as a power like the world has never seen. Of course, China may never realize this potential; such a large population may prove more obstacle than opportunity or China’s communist authorities may try to deny the greater political freedom and economic flexibility that continued high economic growth rates may require. Nonetheless, it appears that China has turned a corner that promises greater prosperity and a more influential position in the world (Yahuda 1996). Thus, a sensible estimate is that China’s power will grow, and, over time, China increasingly will become a country that other major powers balance against vice balance with (Mann 1999 & Yahuda 1996).
Even as it is not possible to predict future power line-ups with certainty, the motive and resource potential available to a few other power centers to balance U.S. power does suggest that the current period of U.S. dominance is transitory. It is likely that China’s power will grow. It also is likely that China and Russia will deepen their strategic cooperation to offset U.S. power, at least initially. It is possible that Russia will achieve stability and strong economic growth such that it can end its dependence on Western aid and rebuild its military power, thereby enhancing its independence of action vis-à-vis all other powers. It is also possible that the European Union will demonstrate sufficient unity and will to be able to resolve or manage conflict within Europe and along its periphery without U.S. participation. In such an increasingly multi-polar world, the United States is likely to remain the most powerful country in the world for years to come, but its independence of action outside of the Western Hemisphere will decline.
Must China begin to emerge as a potential hegemony; the dynamic should be toward a more rigid alliance among the other great powers, perhaps led by the U.S., to balance China. This would produce a bi-polar situation. Should the U.S. or other bloc leader retreat, or be defeated in war, China could emerge as a global hegemony. Multi-polar and bipolar systems each offer advantages and disadvantages for the United States, but a multi-polar system would appear to be the more advantageous, particularly if rising Chinese power is the key differential. The Cold War experience suggests that a bipolar system is highly stable, at least in terms of great power conflict. A bipolar system also may be more conducive than a multi-polar system to sustaining U.S. public support for the costs and risks of an active international role by giving the man in the street a single threat or challenge upon which to fixate. Yet, the Cold War experience also suggests that the black-and-white nature of bipolar systems tends to drive up the costs of an active international role. The starkness and rigidity of bipolar systems foster tendencies to demonize one’s rival, to view competition in zero sum terms, and to adopt expensive proportioned strategies to contain the rival’s power.
A multi-polar arrangement, tends less toward these extremes than a bipolar system, making it easier for the United States to pursue less costly asymmetric strategies to keep power balanced in the international system (Deutsch and Singer 1964). Multi-polar schemes, however, are more complex and require more skillful leadership to maintain the system’s stability. Some will conclude from the United States’ swings this century between Wilsonian idealism and isolationist retrenchment that the United States is incapable of playing its proper role in a multi-polar system and that a multi-polar structure thereby will be unstable. However, it also is reasonable to believe that the United States’ 20th Century experiences—so much different and more global than its 19th Century ones has taught Americans enough about realism and her need to remain actively engaged abroad.
There is another significant reason to favor multi-polarity over bipolarity if the force that would give rise to bipolarity is a rising China. If almost one quarter of the world’s population could be so effectively developed and mobilized less than one state as to impel all the other major powers to align against that state, only a similarly developed and mobilized India perhaps could counter it. The United States could find itself a second- tier power, like the great powers of Western Europe found themselves after the Second World War brought the continental-sized powers of America and the USSR to the fore.
What are the Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy?
The United States should prepare for the emergence of a multi-polar global system so as to maximize its position within it. Power is essential to the defense and advancement of states’ national interests. The greater a state’s power relative to that of its actual and potential rivals and adversaries, the more able it will be to secure outcomes in the anarchic international system that maximize its interests. The weaker the country, the more compromised its interests will be. The United States enjoys unparalleled power today, and naturally will want to enjoy that situation for as long as possible. However, it must also recognize that its current preeminent position and its efforts to maintain or enhance that position excite other powers to exert themselves to balance U.S. power.
Accordingly, the United States, above all other things, should take care to perpetuate those internal attributes that have made it the superpower it is today. In particular, it should safeguard the open and highly competitive nature of its political and economic systems, which reward drive, talent and innovation and provide the country with the flexibility to adjust to ever changing circumstances. Change is inevitable, but its nature is hard to predict, so it is most important to remain able to adjust quickly and successfully.
In a multi-polar world, the United States will be more reliant upon allies and partners to protect and advance its national interests. The United States’ strongest and most natural allies are the European democracies, with whom we share strong ties in many areas. As discussed above, the European’s ongoing efforts to balance U.S. power can be viewed more in terms of their concern about the future reliability of the U.S. superpower to protect their interests than in terms of the U.S. exercising its powers with the intent of harming those interests. The Europeans are unlikely to break with the United States and go it alone unless we give them cause to do so. It is important, therefore, that we avoid acting in ways that the Europeans will perceive as abandonment or as having insufficient regard to their interests and perspectives. The same logic applies to Japan, though those ties are less long and deep.
The United States needs to be patient with and tolerant of Russia (Sands 2001). While Russia’s current situation is likely to move it toward strategic cooperation with China in the near term, its long-term strategic interests are likely to lie in strategic configuration with the West, if Chinese power grows as assumed. There may be rough times ahead for U.S-Russian relations as Russia struggles to find its way in the early 21st Century. The United States must avoid equating the Russians with the Soviet threat—in effect, demonizing the Russians—so as not to complicate and possibly preclude the likely longer-term realignment of Russia with the West. Russia could be a key swing power in the West’s potential emerging strategic competition with an increasingly powerful China.
Similarly, the United States does not want to make a fear of an emerging, hostile Chinese superpower a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is little that the United States or any other power can do, over the long-term, to prevent China from emerging as a great power, if the Chinese take the appropriate economic, political and military approaches toward that end. The United States and other powers can only hope to constrain the exercise of Chinese power as it emerges. We should not accelerate Chinese power development or aggravate their existing resentment of U.S. power by preemptively containing a serious threat to U.S. interests that has not yet emerged. We should also be mindful that in a multi-polar world, particularly should Russia prove more resurgent than expected or if a strong challenge should emerge from Japan or India, we may find common cause with the Chinese on matters of vital importance to us. Hence, our goal must be to avoid, through our own efforts, making an enduring enemy of China.
Conclusion
Consistent with the concept of balance of power, the United States’ contemporary standing as the world’s solitary superpower is impelling at least Russia, China, and the EU member states to seek to balance U.S. power. Their drives diverge, but the likely net result is to move the international system of the 21st Century toward multi-polarity, perhaps even bipolarity, though the former would be preferable for the United States. The clear-cut composition of this emerging multi-polar design will depend largely on the success of the various power centers’ efforts to balance U.S. power as well as the skill with which the U.S. adjusts to the emerging new power centers. The United States should: 1) strive to save its alliance with its EU allies (and Japan), which are its most likely allies; 2) approach Russia as a likely future strategic partner against an emerging Chinese superpower, even as Russia is likely to turn toward China in the near term; and 3) avoid making fear of a potentially emerging, hostile Chinese superpower a self-fulfilling prophecy by engaging China pragmatically rather than trying to contain it preemptively. Since the only certain thing about the next century’s international system is that there will be change, the United States must above all safeguard the trait that have made it a superpower, primarily the open, competitive nature of its political and economic systems.
Issues that must be addressed by policy –makers in regard to China must consider the recent 10 Chinese military modernization drives:
I. Informationalization" And PLA Reform
The PLA is making great strides toward integrating space, air, and ground sensors with automatic command and communication systems. Modern command and control digitalization is evident at high command levels and at the level of the individual soldier, as seen by a poster photo of a PLA soldier outfitted with a personal digital UAV control system. Increasing PLA use of information technologies is shown by soldier use of decision simulators, a new low-light automatic tracking system for helicopters, and a new battlefield artillery/mortar fuse jamming system derived from Russian technology.
II. High Technology and Assassin Mace Weapons:
Evidence of PLA efforts to produce secret and decisive weapons include: a soldier-operated laser gun that can guide munitions or blind the enemy; a 3cm micro-helicopter developed from the 863 Program; and sources who state the PLA has already developed "radio frequency" wepaons that will be used to attack an enemy's electronic infrastructure.
III. Military space
The PLA will soon loft new high resolution radar and electro-optical satellites designed by Russia's NPO Machinostroyena. When space imagery is combined with imagery from expected new UAVs the PLA will be able to compile a continuous picture of its battlespace to assist weapon targeting. Thanks to technology from Britian's Surrey Satellite Ltd., the PLA is able to develop micro and nano satellites, like the NS-1 launched in April 2004. When such satellites are combined with mobile solid fuel space launch vehicles like the KT-1, the PLA will be able to fashion an anti-satellite weapon.
IV The New ICBMs and SLBMs to Defeat US Missile Defense
The PLA envisions that its nuclear and non-nuclear missiles can be used to win a future war over Taiwan. Nuclear missiles like the DF-31 and DF-21 will deter U.S. intervention, while hundreds of DF-15s and DF-11s will attack a wide range of targets on Taiwan.
In July 2004 the PLA launched its first Type 094 SSBN, seen in a U.S. Navy projection, which carries 16 JL-2 SLBMs. It will supplement the PLA's solitary Type 092 SSBN, which was recently described the Pentagon as "operational." Photos: US Navy and via Internet
Works Cited
James Mann, “About Face”: A History of America's Curious Relationship With China From Nixon to Clinton (Knopf, 1999).
Robert Sutter and James J. Przystup, “US-China Relations: Issues and Options” pp. 1-17.
Michael Yahuda, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific,” in Michael Yahuda, ed., The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Rutledge, 1996), pp. 109-157.
NewsMax.com, Putin Defends Missile Sales to Syria, Nuke Sales to Iran (April 28, 2005). http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/4/28/91621.shtml (Accessed on November 12, 2005).
Samuel Huntington’s article “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78 (March/April 1999): 35-49.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, Issue 5 (September/October 1998): 81-94.
Trans-Atlantic Relations “Overcoming New Challenges” Speech by the Rt. Hon. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO (2001). http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010307a.htm (Accessed on November 12, 2005).
Herman Pirchner. The American Foreign Policy Council “With or Against the West: Russia's Debate Continues” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 51-54. http://www.afpc.org/debate.shtml
Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International
Stability,” World Politics 16:3 (1964), pp. 390-406.
Amy Sands, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “View Point: What should the United States Do? (2001). http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/vasands.htm (Accessed on 12. 1.05).
David Jablonsky’s article, “National Power,” in Parameters, 27 (Spring 1997), pp. 34-48,
Stephen M. Walt, “One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1998): 31.
Jialinn Zhang, “U.S.-China Trade Issues After The WTO and The PNTR Deal: A Chinese Perspective,” (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 2000), pp. 1-22. URL version: http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/103/103.pdf (dd: 2005. 8.11).
This paper raises generous questions that will be addressed in turn. First, what other state, view the U.S. as a present or likely threat such that they seek to balance U.S. power, and why? Second, how do these states seek to balance U.S. power? Third, what do these efforts foretell the nature of the next century’s international system? Finally, what are the implications for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st Century?
On Power
The United States is the singular superpower today because it is the only state that currently possesses great power in all the main grouping of power (economic, military, informational, and political) and the will to exercise such power to advance its national interests and offer global leadership (Jablonsky1997).The EU has economic strength (its GDP exceeds that of the U.S.) and two of its members have strategic nuclear weapons, but it presently lacks the unity and will to attain a state of the art military with sizeable power projection capability. Russia and China have strategic nuclear weapons, but lack economic potency; though China’s economic trends are striking (Yahuda 1996). Russia’s instability and economic crisis also have greatly weakened its previously frightening conventional military power capabilities. China’s military is large but ancient. The United States is the world leader in soft power given the pervasiveness of American culture around the world and the pre-eminence of the American-championed ideas of democracy and capitalism—as well as in the information technologies through which such ideas and culture are so widely disseminated ( Keohane and Nye1998).Globalization, therefore, tends to reinforce U.S. power. To challenge U.S. ascendancy, a state or alliance of states must above all be able to rival the U.S. militarily, for which economic strength is essential.
Who is Seeking to Balance U.S. Power and Why?
Russia and China feel exposed by U.S. dominance, each of these power centers perceives it to be in their interest to be able to balance U.S. power and is taking steps in that direction, though they differ in their motives and in their capacity for success (Eikenberry 1999). Japan currently does not appear to be seeking to balance U.S. power, though there are elements within Japan that have voiced support for doing so. Japan may choose to do so in the future. India’s size and nuclear weapons give it great power potential, but it is likely to be preoccupied and inhibited by internal challenges for the predictable future.
Russian loathing toward U.S. dominance stems both from hurt pride and perceived threats to real interests. Universal recognition of the United States as the world’s sole superpower since the Soviet Union’s demise is a constant, bitter reminder to the Russians of just how far they have fallen. Early hopes held by Russia that the United States would continue to treat them like a superpower, and those held by the United States that Russia would support the U.S. vision for a New World Order—hopes that made possible the broad coalition that removed Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 have since been dashed. Russia’s incapacitated military and heavy dependence on Western lending have compelled it to give ground to U.S. pressure on a number of issues important to it, most recently Chechnya and Central Asia, which has only intensified Russian resentment.
Further than pride, Russia recognizes that the United States is the essential proponent for NATO expansion, a development that Russians widely perceive as threatening to their national interests. Cash-strapped Russia, with its few internationally competitive industries, also resents and is economically constrained by U.S. pressure not to make profitable arms and commercial nuclear power sales to U.S. defined rogue states, e.g. Iran (NewsMax.com 2005).
For China, the United States is the prime foreign obstacle to the achievement of some of China’s most important foreign policy goals, including reunification with Taiwan and supremacy, in Asia. U.S. criticism of China’s human rights performance has been a continuing source of tension (Sutter & Przystup 1996 and Zhang 2000). China also has made understandable its concerns about the recent strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship and U.S. theater missile defense cooperation with Japan and Taiwan (Sutter & Przystup 1996). Pride is likely another motivating factor for China, given its great power past and more recent humiliations by stronger powers (Mann 1999).
Less instantaneously apparent is what motivates Europeans to balance U.S. power. Does not the U.S. accord its European allies a high level of security, which they could provide for themselves only with far greater investment in their own defense? Are not the values and systems that the U.S. promotes and protects shared by and beneficial to the Europeans? The answers to these questions are yes, but with costs and risks. One cost is psychological: As with Russia and China, pride partly motivates Europe’s antipathy toward U.S. dominance. This great power envy is most pronounced in France, but is not limited to that European power. Consider Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos’ prideful (and ultimately wrong) assertion, on behalf of the European Community, at the start of the Bosnian crisis in 1991 that “the hour of Europe has dawned” and that Europe could handle that crisis without America’s assistance (The New Republic 1995).
One peril perceived by the Europeans is not that the U.S. will exercise its power in a threatening manner but that it will cease to exercise it at all, or at least reliably. This is the fear of an American return to isolationism or of an American turn eastward as Asia’s economic importance to the U.S. increases relative to that of Europe. Kosovo and Bosnia underscored, to many Europeans’ concern, how utterly dependent the Europeans remain upon U.S. political leadership and military muscle to respond effectively to crises in their own region, much less to those further afield.
The Europeans also recognize that there are prospects associated with being in a position to rival U.S. power and leadership. EU member states have increased their leverage vis-à-vis the United States on economic matters by negotiating as a single entity vice many. If the euro eventually displaces the dollar as the international reserve currency of choice, the associated benefits of being able to sustain higher budget and current account deficits will accrue more to Europe than to America.
How Are They Seeking to Balance U.S. Power?
Power can be balanced in two ways. The first way is for a state to seek to enhance its local power. The second is for a state to aggregate its power with that of other states through alliances, a state also can pursue both ways concurrently.
Russia, China, and the EU each are seeking to develop their own power, but only the EU (Japan, too, should it choose to do so) currently possesses the economic strength necessary to rival U.S. power solely through its own efforts. Russia and China’s economic under-development mean that they have far to go before they can rival U.S. power individually, so they will need to align with others to better balance U.S. power.
Europe’s drive to closer integration, currently discernible in the EU and the euro, can be understood to an important extent as a means to balance U.S. power. The initial drive for union was driven by a desire to bring together the European states in a way that would preclude future wars among them, particularly between France and Germany. By the 1970s, however, that goal could be viewed as largely achieved. Enhanced prosperity is another, continuing motive as EU member states seek to achieve greater economic efficiencies by eliminating barriers to trade among themselves and improving their international negotiating position. But if prosperity is the EU member states’ only other purpose, why do they pursue political integration, particularly the achievement of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)?
While EU member states together now deal with the United States on economic matters as a peer, they remain far from that status with regard to political matters, particularly those involving the use of force. This reflects the greater reticence of some major EU member states to pool sovereignty on matters of blood, which are more serious than matters of treasure. It also reflects a failure to invest in leading edge defense capabilities, such as precision guided munitions, reconnaissance, and strategic lift.
EU members, however, have undertaken to redress at least partially their military dependence upon the United States. The vehicle has come to be known as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) initiative. France originated the concept of developing a stronger and more cohesive European military instrument than the Western European Union (WEU) that could act independently of the United States. The United States feared that the development of a European military capability outside of NATO would weaken the transatlantic alliance.
Russia and China currently lack the level of development and, particularly in Russia’s case, internal stability to be able to rival U.S. power, military or economic, in the near term. They will, of course, seek to raise their level of development as do all nations for reasons both domestic and international. In the meantime, however, their only option for balancing U.S. power is through alliance with other powers (Yahuda 1996). Accordingly, we see evidence of Russia and China moving closer to one another for just that purpose. Since the Cold War’s end, Russian and Chinese leaders have discussed their need to cooperate to balance U.S. power (Rashid 1999). They have moved to resolve outstanding border disputes and to reduce the forces each stations along that border (Washington Post, Dec 28, 1996). Russia is again selling and China is again buying sophisticated combat aircraft and other arms from Russia. Such developments contrast sharply with their previous difficulty, even hostile, relations (Yahuda 1996).
A fragile Russia, unlike a strong Soviet Union, is not a strategic threat to China but a potential strategic partner against the only country currently able to seriously obstruct China’s international wellbeing, the United States. For Russia, alliance with China gives it greater weight vis-à-vis the U.S. and Europe at a time of exceptional weakness and it does so at relatively little current risk (Yahuda 1996). China currently lacks a modern military, and it is giving priority to its domestic economic development over modernizing its armed forces. Russia must be the more careful partner in this configuration, however. On current trends, and given their relative population resource bases, China looks likely to emerge eventually as a much stronger power than Russia. With more territory than any other country in the world, a population roughly a tenth of China’s (and concentrated in the west), and the only major power with a ground border with China, Russia could one day become China’s strategic target instead of its strategic partner. Down the road, Russia may need to align with others, including possibly Europe and the United States, against China (Pirchner 2003).
What are the Implications?
Russian, Chinese, and European efforts to balance U.S. power promise significant change for the international system in the 21st century. The specific changes will depend upon the success of these balancing efforts as well as on the United States’ own actions.
It is uncertain whether the European Union will muster the unity and will necessary to rival the United States militarily. Defense is more central to sovereignty than economics, and it is in the area of defense that EU member states have ceded the least sovereignty to Brussels.
The harshness of Russia’s current political and economic problems and the diminishment of its great power potential as a result of the loss of population and territory following the Soviet Union’s demise make it unlikely that Russia will reemerge as a global rival to the United States. Russia may yet achieve internal stability and turn its economy around, but even then will likely depend on alliance in some form with another power center to protect its vital interests in the future. Its initial alliance is likely to be with China, but as previously discussed, it may later need to look west to balance China.
China, in the near-term, is likely to increase its strategic cooperation with Russia in order to mitigate U.S. power, as discussed above. Unlike Russia, China has the potential over the longer term to challenge U.S. supremacy directly—indeed, to emerge as a power like the world has never seen. Of course, China may never realize this potential; such a large population may prove more obstacle than opportunity or China’s communist authorities may try to deny the greater political freedom and economic flexibility that continued high economic growth rates may require. Nonetheless, it appears that China has turned a corner that promises greater prosperity and a more influential position in the world (Yahuda 1996). Thus, a sensible estimate is that China’s power will grow, and, over time, China increasingly will become a country that other major powers balance against vice balance with (Mann 1999 & Yahuda 1996).
Even as it is not possible to predict future power line-ups with certainty, the motive and resource potential available to a few other power centers to balance U.S. power does suggest that the current period of U.S. dominance is transitory. It is likely that China’s power will grow. It also is likely that China and Russia will deepen their strategic cooperation to offset U.S. power, at least initially. It is possible that Russia will achieve stability and strong economic growth such that it can end its dependence on Western aid and rebuild its military power, thereby enhancing its independence of action vis-à-vis all other powers. It is also possible that the European Union will demonstrate sufficient unity and will to be able to resolve or manage conflict within Europe and along its periphery without U.S. participation. In such an increasingly multi-polar world, the United States is likely to remain the most powerful country in the world for years to come, but its independence of action outside of the Western Hemisphere will decline.
Must China begin to emerge as a potential hegemony; the dynamic should be toward a more rigid alliance among the other great powers, perhaps led by the U.S., to balance China. This would produce a bi-polar situation. Should the U.S. or other bloc leader retreat, or be defeated in war, China could emerge as a global hegemony. Multi-polar and bipolar systems each offer advantages and disadvantages for the United States, but a multi-polar system would appear to be the more advantageous, particularly if rising Chinese power is the key differential. The Cold War experience suggests that a bipolar system is highly stable, at least in terms of great power conflict. A bipolar system also may be more conducive than a multi-polar system to sustaining U.S. public support for the costs and risks of an active international role by giving the man in the street a single threat or challenge upon which to fixate. Yet, the Cold War experience also suggests that the black-and-white nature of bipolar systems tends to drive up the costs of an active international role. The starkness and rigidity of bipolar systems foster tendencies to demonize one’s rival, to view competition in zero sum terms, and to adopt expensive proportioned strategies to contain the rival’s power.
A multi-polar arrangement, tends less toward these extremes than a bipolar system, making it easier for the United States to pursue less costly asymmetric strategies to keep power balanced in the international system (Deutsch and Singer 1964). Multi-polar schemes, however, are more complex and require more skillful leadership to maintain the system’s stability. Some will conclude from the United States’ swings this century between Wilsonian idealism and isolationist retrenchment that the United States is incapable of playing its proper role in a multi-polar system and that a multi-polar structure thereby will be unstable. However, it also is reasonable to believe that the United States’ 20th Century experiences—so much different and more global than its 19th Century ones has taught Americans enough about realism and her need to remain actively engaged abroad.
There is another significant reason to favor multi-polarity over bipolarity if the force that would give rise to bipolarity is a rising China. If almost one quarter of the world’s population could be so effectively developed and mobilized less than one state as to impel all the other major powers to align against that state, only a similarly developed and mobilized India perhaps could counter it. The United States could find itself a second- tier power, like the great powers of Western Europe found themselves after the Second World War brought the continental-sized powers of America and the USSR to the fore.
What are the Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy?
The United States should prepare for the emergence of a multi-polar global system so as to maximize its position within it. Power is essential to the defense and advancement of states’ national interests. The greater a state’s power relative to that of its actual and potential rivals and adversaries, the more able it will be to secure outcomes in the anarchic international system that maximize its interests. The weaker the country, the more compromised its interests will be. The United States enjoys unparalleled power today, and naturally will want to enjoy that situation for as long as possible. However, it must also recognize that its current preeminent position and its efforts to maintain or enhance that position excite other powers to exert themselves to balance U.S. power.
Accordingly, the United States, above all other things, should take care to perpetuate those internal attributes that have made it the superpower it is today. In particular, it should safeguard the open and highly competitive nature of its political and economic systems, which reward drive, talent and innovation and provide the country with the flexibility to adjust to ever changing circumstances. Change is inevitable, but its nature is hard to predict, so it is most important to remain able to adjust quickly and successfully.
In a multi-polar world, the United States will be more reliant upon allies and partners to protect and advance its national interests. The United States’ strongest and most natural allies are the European democracies, with whom we share strong ties in many areas. As discussed above, the European’s ongoing efforts to balance U.S. power can be viewed more in terms of their concern about the future reliability of the U.S. superpower to protect their interests than in terms of the U.S. exercising its powers with the intent of harming those interests. The Europeans are unlikely to break with the United States and go it alone unless we give them cause to do so. It is important, therefore, that we avoid acting in ways that the Europeans will perceive as abandonment or as having insufficient regard to their interests and perspectives. The same logic applies to Japan, though those ties are less long and deep.
The United States needs to be patient with and tolerant of Russia (Sands 2001). While Russia’s current situation is likely to move it toward strategic cooperation with China in the near term, its long-term strategic interests are likely to lie in strategic configuration with the West, if Chinese power grows as assumed. There may be rough times ahead for U.S-Russian relations as Russia struggles to find its way in the early 21st Century. The United States must avoid equating the Russians with the Soviet threat—in effect, demonizing the Russians—so as not to complicate and possibly preclude the likely longer-term realignment of Russia with the West. Russia could be a key swing power in the West’s potential emerging strategic competition with an increasingly powerful China.
Similarly, the United States does not want to make a fear of an emerging, hostile Chinese superpower a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is little that the United States or any other power can do, over the long-term, to prevent China from emerging as a great power, if the Chinese take the appropriate economic, political and military approaches toward that end. The United States and other powers can only hope to constrain the exercise of Chinese power as it emerges. We should not accelerate Chinese power development or aggravate their existing resentment of U.S. power by preemptively containing a serious threat to U.S. interests that has not yet emerged. We should also be mindful that in a multi-polar world, particularly should Russia prove more resurgent than expected or if a strong challenge should emerge from Japan or India, we may find common cause with the Chinese on matters of vital importance to us. Hence, our goal must be to avoid, through our own efforts, making an enduring enemy of China.
Conclusion
Consistent with the concept of balance of power, the United States’ contemporary standing as the world’s solitary superpower is impelling at least Russia, China, and the EU member states to seek to balance U.S. power. Their drives diverge, but the likely net result is to move the international system of the 21st Century toward multi-polarity, perhaps even bipolarity, though the former would be preferable for the United States. The clear-cut composition of this emerging multi-polar design will depend largely on the success of the various power centers’ efforts to balance U.S. power as well as the skill with which the U.S. adjusts to the emerging new power centers. The United States should: 1) strive to save its alliance with its EU allies (and Japan), which are its most likely allies; 2) approach Russia as a likely future strategic partner against an emerging Chinese superpower, even as Russia is likely to turn toward China in the near term; and 3) avoid making fear of a potentially emerging, hostile Chinese superpower a self-fulfilling prophecy by engaging China pragmatically rather than trying to contain it preemptively. Since the only certain thing about the next century’s international system is that there will be change, the United States must above all safeguard the trait that have made it a superpower, primarily the open, competitive nature of its political and economic systems.
Issues that must be addressed by policy –makers in regard to China must consider the recent 10 Chinese military modernization drives:
I. Informationalization" And PLA Reform
The PLA is making great strides toward integrating space, air, and ground sensors with automatic command and communication systems. Modern command and control digitalization is evident at high command levels and at the level of the individual soldier, as seen by a poster photo of a PLA soldier outfitted with a personal digital UAV control system. Increasing PLA use of information technologies is shown by soldier use of decision simulators, a new low-light automatic tracking system for helicopters, and a new battlefield artillery/mortar fuse jamming system derived from Russian technology.
II. High Technology and Assassin Mace Weapons:
Evidence of PLA efforts to produce secret and decisive weapons include: a soldier-operated laser gun that can guide munitions or blind the enemy; a 3cm micro-helicopter developed from the 863 Program; and sources who state the PLA has already developed "radio frequency" wepaons that will be used to attack an enemy's electronic infrastructure.
III. Military space
The PLA will soon loft new high resolution radar and electro-optical satellites designed by Russia's NPO Machinostroyena. When space imagery is combined with imagery from expected new UAVs the PLA will be able to compile a continuous picture of its battlespace to assist weapon targeting. Thanks to technology from Britian's Surrey Satellite Ltd., the PLA is able to develop micro and nano satellites, like the NS-1 launched in April 2004. When such satellites are combined with mobile solid fuel space launch vehicles like the KT-1, the PLA will be able to fashion an anti-satellite weapon.
IV The New ICBMs and SLBMs to Defeat US Missile Defense
The PLA envisions that its nuclear and non-nuclear missiles can be used to win a future war over Taiwan. Nuclear missiles like the DF-31 and DF-21 will deter U.S. intervention, while hundreds of DF-15s and DF-11s will attack a wide range of targets on Taiwan.
In July 2004 the PLA launched its first Type 094 SSBN, seen in a U.S. Navy projection, which carries 16 JL-2 SLBMs. It will supplement the PLA's solitary Type 092 SSBN, which was recently described the Pentagon as "operational." Photos: US Navy and via Internet
Works Cited
James Mann, “About Face”: A History of America's Curious Relationship With China From Nixon to Clinton (Knopf, 1999).
Robert Sutter and James J. Przystup, “US-China Relations: Issues and Options” pp. 1-17.
Michael Yahuda, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific,” in Michael Yahuda, ed., The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Rutledge, 1996), pp. 109-157.
NewsMax.com, Putin Defends Missile Sales to Syria, Nuke Sales to Iran (April 28, 2005). http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/4/28/91621.shtml (Accessed on November 12, 2005).
Samuel Huntington’s article “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78 (March/April 1999): 35-49.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, Issue 5 (September/October 1998): 81-94.
Trans-Atlantic Relations “Overcoming New Challenges” Speech by the Rt. Hon. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO (2001). http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010307a.htm (Accessed on November 12, 2005).
Herman Pirchner. The American Foreign Policy Council “With or Against the West: Russia's Debate Continues” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 51-54. http://www.afpc.org/debate.shtml
Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International
Stability,” World Politics 16:3 (1964), pp. 390-406.
Amy Sands, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “View Point: What should the United States Do? (2001). http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/vasands.htm (Accessed on 12. 1.05).
David Jablonsky’s article, “National Power,” in Parameters, 27 (Spring 1997), pp. 34-48,
Stephen M. Walt, “One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1998): 31.
Jialinn Zhang, “U.S.-China Trade Issues After The WTO and The PNTR Deal: A Chinese Perspective,” (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 2000), pp. 1-22. URL version: http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/103/103.pdf (dd: 2005. 8.11).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
