Iran and The Bomb: Why It must be Stopped Now Or...

I find it absurd and indeed very dangerous when some suggests that Iranian claim that it is not seeking nuclear weapons or the notion that a nuclear Iran is not dangerous. Iran’s political and religious leaders continually declare the object of destroying the Jewish State of Israel, and in 2005, Iran’s then new president Ahmadinejad repeated the threat in a public forum. Days earlier, the elegant streets of Tehran were riddled with Missiles on parade, decorated with posters declaring the intention to “wipe Israel off the map.” Iranian links with Shiite militants in Iraq, Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are stronger than ever.

With a nuclear shield from Iran these groups could morph into erratic but confident entities which could mean that attacks on the state of Israel will intensify. A capricious situation reminiscent of that of India and Pakistan could emerge, where in 1998 and again in 2001, Pakistan based insurgents thought they were immune from assault due to the perceived nuclear balance of power, which led to a major crisis that came close to a nuclear shoot-out.

I believe Iran presents a grave security challenge to world stability and in particular the livelihood of many Israelis. This is exacerbated by the fact that key players, Israel and Iran have no direct diplomatic relations. India and Pakistan had and do have diplomatic relations and reliable-direct communications, which in my opinion spared the two, the region and potentially, the world a disastrous conflict. Undeniably, Iranian politicians lack any appreciation or even minimal understanding of our (US) and Israel foreign values.

As a student of international security policy, I’m not confused in any way that, Iranian advance toward the development of nuclear weapons will spark regional proliferation involving Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia and further undermine international community’s efforts roll-back proliferation in Central Asia, East Asia and prevention in the rest of the world. These countries, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have retained lower-level nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, which have become more active recently as Iran has intensified its efforts.

Technologically, the current status of Iran's nuclear program includes the development of a nuclear fuel cycle, under an emaciated pretext of civil applications, but moving towards highly enriched uranium production capability that is useful primarily for making nuclear explosives.

Iranian government deceptive behavior is well documented. Several once secret nuclear installations were uncovered and made public, including a so-called pilot enrichment plant at Natanz. The fact is that all these installations and facilities are unambiguous contravention of IAEA requirements under its reporting, verification, and safeguards arrangements.

Iran has also denied access to IAEA inspectors, in violation of the additional protocol and enhanced safeguards agreement which Iran has signed and pledged to abide by, but has not ratified. Iran has been reprimanded in IAEA reports, but the agency had, until last year, avoided a clear judgment which would have triggered the UN Security Council sanctions process, and conceivably lead to Iranian withdrawal from the NPT.

The chance of any diplomatic offensive is slow-but-steadily slipping away. A military confrontation may unfortunately be emerging as the only credible and viable option to stop Tehran from acquiring a nuclear bomb. I urge European, Russian, Asian and African leaders not to be fooled Iranian political.

Iranian nuclear development cannot and MUST not be compared to that of Iraq in 2003 and the controversy that continues, but rather has semblance to that of Tripoli or Pyongyang. In the Iranian case we have unmistakable and detailed evidence of nuclear weapons efforts, not conjecture or extrapolation. The nuclear watch-dog, IAEA, has samples of enriched uranium and other materials. In addition, technically speaking, Iran's nuclear fuel cycle constituents are far more evident than former Saddam Hussein’s Iraq small chemical and biological facilities.